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Abstract 
 
Immigration has historically been a federal issue; recently however, localities, counties, and 
states have passed their own laws aimed at immigrants. The majority of these ordinances have 
occurred at the local-level, and in particular, in small rural towns. This research examines what 
makes rural towns different from urban areas and why some rural towns have decided to pass 
immigrant ordinances in their community. Previous studies suggest that ideology and 
partisanship drive attitudes towards immigrants and policy, however, their data does not account 
for geographic location. Geographic location is an important element that needs to be included 
when investigating the local immigrant policy support. Because of the dynamics in a small town, 
the limited resources available, rural residents are more psychologically anxious and threatened 
by recent immigrants than urban residents. The increases in Latino population throughout rural 
America are heightened by the fact that there are few areas of education, worship, and recreation 
in small towns. These demographic changes make rural residents feel like they are losing 
important political and economic power due to immigrants. The perception of loss by rural 
residents leads them to be more likely to support local immigrant ordinances in their community 
as a way to diminish the Latino presence and discourage further immigration into their town. 
With this research, I am adding another dimension into scholarly knowledge on the factors that 
shape immigrant policy attitudes. By including geographic location and psychological factors, I 
move past the “who” supports immigrant ordinances and a clearer picture emerges of why some 
people support these local laws.  
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Introduction 
Each election year, especially presidential election years, the media touts the growing 
Hispanic electorate. The growing size of the Hispanic electorate signifies the overall growth of 
the Latino population in the United States. The most recent U.S. Census (2010) confirmed what 
most demographers had estimated; an immense growth of the Latino population. The census 
showed that Hispanics now make up over 16% of the total U.S. population, over 50 million 
residents. These findings represent a 43% increase in the number of Latinos since the 2000 U.S. 
census. In fact, Latinos accounted for over half of the nation-wide growth. Perhaps most 
interesting, for the first time in American history, minority births outnumbered non-Hispanic 
white births.  
The 2010 U.S. census put Latinos front and center. The Latino growth led to national 
media coverage on the economic and political power of Latinos. In a 2012 study, the Latino 
buying power was estimated at 1.2 trillion dollars, which was larger than all but 13 countries in 
the world (Waldman 2012).  Politically, Latinos accounted for 10% of the total votes cast in the 
2012 presidential election (Lopez & Taylor 2012). President Obama’s Latino vote share was the 
second highest in history with 71% of all Latinos voting to reelect the president. President 
Obama beat Mitt Romney for the Latino vote by a whopping 44 points. The power of the Latino 
vote was most felt in swing states like Florida, Nevada, and Colorado where Latinos voted to 
reelect the President in margins of 60% to 39%, 70% to 25% and 75% to 23%, respectively 
(ibid).  
Latinos’ increasing share of economic and political power has also brought increased 
backlash on Latinos. State and local immigration policies aimed at Latino immigrants have 
increased dramatically since 2000. States like Arizona, Alabama, and Georgia have passed these 
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laws claiming that immigrants are a burden to their state. At the local level, towns like Fremont, 
NE pass anti-immigrant ordinances arguing that immigrants are a threat to their quality of life. 
For supporters of these laws, Latino immigrants1 have become a threat to their livelihood and 
well-being. 
 Studies on White backlash against ethnic and racial minorities have been analyzed at the 
national (Brader et. al 2008; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood III and Morris 1997; Ha 2010), state 
(Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Schildkraut 2001; Nicolson-Crotty and Nicolson-Crotty  2011), 
and local level (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Jones-Correa 2004; 
Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Varsanyi 2008; Esbenshade 2007).  
These studies illustrate that when whites feel racially threatened they tend to support 
policies that reduce social and economic benefits that affect minorities. More recently, studies 
that focus on white backlash towards immigrants have typically focused on the passing of state 
(Schildkraut 2001) and local laws (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005) that can be interpreted to be 
anti-immigrant or anti-Hispanic. After the eruption of immigration protests across the country in 
2006, the federal government did little to address immigration at the national level, yet, as we 
have seen recently state and local governments have decided to address the “immigration 
problem” on their own. States and localities have used local ordinances as ways to diminish their 
current Latino population and preemptively strike down the growing immigrant population in 
hopes of discouraging further immigration (Cornwell 2010). These laws and ordinances have 
drawn strong support and opposition across the country. In some cases, they have gained national 
                                                 
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term immigrants to reference Latino immigrants and populations. This can 
mean individuals whose nation of origin may include Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the rest of Central and South 
America. I make this clear because attitudes towards immigrants can differ depending on country of origin. Anglo-
Americans are much more likely to oppose immigration when the immigrant is of a Latin American background 
than when they are European (Brader et. al. 2008).   
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attention for states like Arizona, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina and localities like 
Hazelton, PA, Farmers Branch, TX, and Fremont, NE. 
The main research questions that I intend to address in this dissertation include: Are small 
towns significantly different from larger urban areas in their support for laws that could be 
viewed as anti-immigrant? Why have some rural towns across the United States, in recent years, 
decided to pass local immigration policies? What factors influence citizens who live in these 
types of small towns to support or oppose anti-immigration ordinances in their town?  
While many definitions of rural may come to mind, throughout this dissertation I use the 
United States’ Department of Agriculture’s (USDA 2008) definition of rural town which 
includes any locality with a population below 50,000 residents. Most studies examining 
immigration policy attitudes attribute their findings to ideological and partisan leanings, while I 
agree with these theories; I argue that attitudes are based on psychological feelings towards 
immigrants. I suggest that feelings of anxiety and threat felt by white residents who live in rural 
areas significantly contribute to whether or not they support anti-immigrant ordinances. As threat 
theory suggests, the in-groups’ anxiety will increase when there are feelings of loss due to a 
growing threat. I argue rural residents are more likely to view immigrants as a threat to their 
general well-being and livelihood than urban residents. In turn, these feelings of threat make 
rural residents more likely than urban residents to support anti-immigrant policies. Further, I 
illustrate that white residents who live in small towns will be more likely to support anti-
immigrant policies when they exhibit individual feelings of threat. Finally, using rural town-level 
data, I will demonstrate the types of towns that are most likely to pass local anti-immigrant 
ordinances.  
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Testing theories of threat and anxiety, I argue, are best when used to analyze smaller 
populations. When in-group and out-group members are forced into a small melting pot, how 
does the in-group react when they feel their livelihood is as stake because of the increased 
perception of competition and threat? 
Large cities across the U.S. still exhibit various degrees of residential segregation due to 
past governmental policies (Lipsitz 1998). In urban areas, residential neighborhoods include all 
the amenities that each racial and ethnic group might need to live their everyday lives. These 
neighborhoods may include schools, places of worship, shopping, grocery stores, places of 
employment, and entertainment. City neighborhoods provide each respected group the 
necessities for their livelihood, with little need to roam past an individual’s neighborhood. 
Therefore, I question how much exposure the in-group actually has to the out-groups in a city 
environment. In rural towns, the options for everyday life are limited, thus, one must come into 
contact with members from other groups regardless of one’s culture, race, class, or 
neighborhood. Rural areas are limited in their resources available to individuals such as political 
power, jobs, education, shopping, places of worship, and places of entertainment. I believe this is 
a better context to measure threat, which is why I focus my analysis on rural towns.  
Threat and Anxiety 
I argue that partisanship and ideology are not the only factors driving policy attitudes 
towards immigrants. I add to relevant literature by suggesting that attitudes are based on the 
perception of threat and the anxiety that immigrants trigger to the white rural population. The 
threat theory’s origins are rooted in studies done by Key (1949) and Blalock (1967). The central 
premise suggests that as the presence of an out-group increase, hostility by the in-group will 
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follow due to the competition for scarce resources. Most studies on threat theory focus on the 
scarcity of resources that include political and economic power (Ha 2010).  
These are the most mentioned resources because of their importance especially at the 
local level. The ability to control political power usually means that one group has an advantage 
over others in the voting booth.  If a group is largely in control of the voting in a locale, then we 
can assume that they are more likely to vote for members of their own group. This means that the 
in-group will benefit from their political officials. Political benefits can come in a variety of 
forms such as role models for children, tax breaks or incentives for the wealthy, business 
opportunities for close social networks, or substantive representation in their community. 
Economic power typically means the amount of jobs and housing that are available in a given 
community. A common argument by advocates for immigration control is that immigrants are 
taking American jobs. This illustrates how the perception of immigrants being a threat to the 
well-being of rural whites can affect how they might feel towards policies that can be viewed as 
anti-immigrant.  
Some studies argue that racial difference is a component of threat. Scholars of the racial 
threat hypothesis posit that there is an ongoing competition between races and individuals of 
different racial and ethnic backgrounds (Taylor 1998). For example, Branton and Jones (2005) 
suggest when the diversity of a city increases individuals with low socio-economic status are 
more likely to exhibit anti-minority attitudes. By diversity the authors suggest that as more 
minorities come into the city, policy attitudes are changed. Therefore, the attitudes towards 
policy are a function of how many minorities may be in a certain locality. Thus, this finding 
would suggest that in a smaller locale, such as a rural town in Nebraska, as the minority 
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population increases so too should the backlash against Latinos. Moreover, the backlash may be 
heighted because of the dynamics of a small town.  
Competition between minorities is also possible. Because minorities tend to compete 
against each other for many of the same types of jobs, African Americans may feel threatened 
due to the presence of a large Latino group. Gay’s (2006) findings support this form of racial 
threat. In her study, she finds that the competition for jobs between Blacks and Latinos 
influenced policy preferences among African Americans. As presence of Latinos increased, 
Black residents began to feel that their well-being and livelihood was being threatened because 
of the increased competition for economic and political power.  These threats led to blacks 
exhibiting higher levels of negative stereotypes of Latinos and expressing less commonality 
between groups in terms of political power and policy preferences.  
Public opinion on immigration is largely based on the feelings of threat felt by whites 
who may believe they are losing economic and political power (Hood III & Morris 1997; Brader 
et. al. 2008; Branton & Jones 2005). As the presence of threat increases due to the growing 
Latino population, whites tend to hold more negative preferences on immigration policy.  
I expand on the previous studies’ limited use of sampling data by focusing my attention 
on rural areas. Each of the studies mentioned above use national data that typically oversamples 
urban areas. I expand on these studies and suggest that threat is more likely to occur in small 
towns where the resources available to all residents are limited and where changing 
demographics would be more readily seen and felt by whites. 
Overview 
In this dissertation, I illustrate several different, but related points on rural immigration 
attitudes. First, I show how geography differs between residents who live in urban and rural 
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areas. I argue that rural residents are significantly different from urban residents in their 
immigration attitudes. I analyze data from three nationally representative samples. In this 
analysis, I illustrate that rural residents are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies 
at the state and local level. I use state and local levels because they are home to the most recent 
immigration policies passed, due to the inaction of the federal government.   
Second, I go beyond the previous arguments of partisanship and ideology by contending 
that support for and opposition against immigration ordinances is shaped by psychological 
perceptions of contact and threat. I show rural residents are more likely to believe they come into 
a lot of contact with immigrants. This contact makes them feel uneasy and uncomfortable. 
Further, I illustrate that rural residents are more likely to have negative perceptions of 
immigrants. I argue that the policy decision-making processes of rural residents are influenced 
by these negative perceptions.  
Third, I look at a Midwestern case study of residents in four rural communities. I 
illustrate that rural residents who feel their livelihood is threatened by immigrants are most likely 
to support anti-immigrant ordinances in their town.  
Finally, I illustrate the types of rural towns that are more likely to pass local immigration 
ordinances and discuss why. By using a city-level dataset comprised entirely of rural towns, I am 
able to demonstrate how Hispanic growth significantly increases the likelihood of passing a local 
immigrant ordinance.  
This dissertation serves to expand our knowledge in multiple avenues of research that 
have previously gone untapped, including: urban vs. rural political psychology, individual-level 
determinants of support for local immigration laws, and rural city-level immigration policy.  It 
will engage scholarly research to think about how geographic location is related to feelings of 
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threat.  It will also serve as a focal point in illustrating public opinion on immigration in rural 
areas which has yet to be investigated even though rural areas are experiencing the greatest 
growth of the Hispanic population (U.S. Census 2010). Finally, it will engage practitioners, 
politicians, and scholars to think about how negative feelings about immigrants might be 
overcome. 
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Chapter 1: Rural America 
The politics of “place” in America has received very little scholarly attention from 
political scientists in recent decades. Sociologists have long been concerned with this divide and 
entire journals are devoted to the study of rural sociology. However, a number of works suggest 
that we cannot continue to neglect the urban-rural divide in America and its effect on politics and 
policy attitudes. The fact that some Americas choose to live in urban areas while others choose 
to live in rural areas is not a coincidence. Scholarly work suggests that Americans “self-sort” into 
clusters of like-minded communities increasing the “cultural distance” between Americans 
(Bishop 2008). Rural residents may want to be further way from other cultures and they have 
chosen to live in rural areas to be with people with like-minded views of the world, but perhaps 
more importantly, further away from individuals who are not like them. Whites who may not like 
people of other races and religion may choose to live in rural areas because of the traditional 
world views of their like-minded neighbors. I argue, traditional world views, or views of what 
American identity and culture should be, are strongly held view-points in rural America, and 
change is slow.  
Self-sorting does influence how Americans feel about public policy. Isolation leads to 
fear and anxiety of the unknown. According to Fennelly and Federico (2008) rural residents tend 
to have more negative feelings towards outsiders because they are isolated from typical 
immigrant communities. Since they are isolated, when immigrants do come into their 
community, they become more likely to favor restrictive immigrant policies because of their 
feelings of anxiety (ibid).  
 It is not just demographics and socioeconomic indicators that separate the rural from the 
urban; the divide is also leading to important impacts on our political system. In 2004, the 
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majority of every city over 500,000 voted for democrats and John Kerry (Raban 2010). Broken 
down more specifically, towns with a population under 25,000 had a democratic voting rate of 
36%, compared to 52% for cities over 300,000 (Gimple and Karnes 2006). Mckee (2008) argues 
that the difference between blue states and red states are how rural communities vote. In his 
analysis of presidential elections, he illustrates that swing or “purple” states include rural 
communities that vote closely with the urban population (Mckee 2008). But as the numbers 
illustrate, few rural areas are likely to vote like urban communities, and the disparity is quite 
large. 
Rural areas not only display differences during presidential elections, but also differences 
in their preference of candidates. Female candidates are less likely to win election in rural areas 
than their urban counterparts (Stiles and Schwab 2009). This may occur, in part, because of the 
traditionalist views held by rural residents. The status quo holds that men are thought of as more 
likely to have the knowledge and ambition to run for political office (Elder 2004).  
There are certainly differences between rural and urban residents when analyzing their 
voting behavior. What drives these differences? In viewing the voting rates for republicans in 
rural communities, commentators rightly ask why conservatives seem to have such a stronghold 
in these areas (Frank 2004). One popular line of thinking is that social issues and the culture war 
drive rural voters to conservatism and the Republican Party. The increasing electoral power of 
the Christian right, especially in rural areas, was the direct outcome of politicians like Barry 
Goldwater and Ronald Regan coming to national prominence (Green and Guth 1988). Still, 
others contend that economic concerns like private property and limited government are crucial 
in understanding rural ideology (Gimple and Karnes 2006); this might be especially true for 
small farmers who tend to disagree with many federal policies (Knoke and Henry 1977). Low 
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levels of education among rural communities are also found to be long tied to conservative 
voting patterns and rural areas have continuously experienced severe disadvantages when it 
comes to educational equality (Roscigno et al 2006). Regardless of the source of the divide, it is 
an important factor that requires more serious study by political scientists.  
It is widely known that Latinos, especially Mexican Americans (60 percent of Latinos in 
the U.S.), are situated along the urban areas of the Southwest (Durand et. al. 2005). However, 
international legislation and economic factors have contributed to the recent growth of Latinos in 
new areas of the country. The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 
1986 allowed many undocumented immigrants to begin looking for work legally (Durand et. al., 
1999) in locales other than urban areas. The economic downturn in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s in the United States left many newly naturalized citizens with difficulty finding work in 
highly populated Latino areas such as Texas and California (ibid). Moreover, the 1994 peso 
crisis in Mexico following the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement increased 
the immigration of Mexicans looking for work in the United States (Shultz 2008). Increased 
competition over jobs in places like Texas and California, with a weak economy, led many new 
immigrants to find work in new areas of the country (Schultz 2008). However, many of the areas 
with available work were unaccustomed to immigrant populations.  
Hispanic Growth in Rural Areas 
In 1980, Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., now known as Tyson Fresh Meats, opened up the 
world’s largest beef processing plant near Garden City, KS. Just three years later a competing 
plant opened up just a few miles away (Broadway and Stull, 2005). The combined workforce of 
the two plants was over 4000, which made jobs easily assessable in this area of Southwestern 
Kansas (ibid). Almost overnight Finney County (home to Garden City) became a biracial 
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community due to the influx of Latinos (native and foreign born) to the area (ibid). This 
phenomenon was not limited to Garden City, KS, nor to the Midwest, but to many different parts 
of the country including Dodge City, KS, Storm Lake, IA, Hamlet, NC, Greely, CO, Buena 
Vista, GA, and Indianola, MS among others (Stull et. al. 1995). The growth of these large-scale 
meat-packing plants represents the movement of these companies from urban communities to the 
rural areas. The costs associated with keeping plants in urban areas: higher taxes, the terrible 
odor, and toxin complaints all contributed to the growth of meat-packing plants in rural America.  
My research for this dissertation largely took place in four rural communities that have 
seen dramatic growth in their Hispanic population due to meat-packing plants. With funding 
from the University Of Kansas Department Of Political Science, my colleagues and I traveled to 
Dodge City and Garden City in Kansas and Grand Island and Fremont in Nebraska. We were 
able to survey over 300 respondents and interview nearly 30 political and business elites. In my 
research, local leaders expressed their commitment to offering cheap land and tax incentives to 
these large companies to lure them into their community. Large scale employment opportunities 
are not readily available in rural areas as much as they are in the city. So the ability of a small 
town to lure one or more of these companies into their area is viewed as a boon to the economy. 
Indeed, all four communities we visited-Dodge City (4.8%), Garden City (5.1%), Fremont (4%), 
and Grand Island (3.3%)-are well under the national unemployment rate of 6.7%,  
Since the beginning, the dilemma for the towns and companies building these meat plants 
has been the population. Most small towns do not have the population & workforce to support 
large scale production plants. The smaller populations that live in rural towns, for the most part, 
already have their jobs. The only way a large scale meat-packing plant can remain profitable is it 
is continually producing. When a plant is built, at its inception, most small towns do not have the 
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workforce needed operate the plant on a daily basis. Talking to local officials, several mentioned 
to us the recruiting that goes on within these large companies. Immigrants living in urban areas 
hear about good paying jobs available in small towns from family members or friends. This in 
turn creates a pipeline of word-of-mouth recruiting. Friends and family members already in the 
United States and those living outside the U.S. share the information regarding job openings with 
high starting pay where most jobs start at around 14.00 or 15.00/hour. Therefore, while the 
companies do not actively recruit in other countries, they certainly do not discourage their 
employees from expressing their excitement about job opportunities to their friends and family 
members. Changing demographics in small towns is, no doubt, a function of the employment 
opportunities available to those willing to migrate.  
The Latino experience in these rural communities has been less than overtly positive. In 
his study on Latino immigrants in rural Central Kentucky, Shultz (2008) observes that Latino 
men often viewed their community as “tranquilo”, meaning calm, peaceful, and safe; however, 
most of his interviewees attribute low interaction between Anglos and Latinos due to language 
barriers (ibid). Research suggests there is widespread perception among Anglos that a meat 
processing plant will bring increased crime, poverty, language issues, along with heavier prices 
for schools, healthcare, and low income housing (Artz, et. al. 2010; Broadway, Stull, and 
Podraza 1994; Broadway & Stull 2005; Grey 1997a, b). Yet, according to Artz et. al. (2010), 
communities find the benefits outweigh the costs related to bringing in large employers to their 
towns.  
In these examples, we see the dilemma facing local politicians. First, rural residents 
believe that these industries bring in new residents, largely immigrants, and therefore crime 
increases and their well-being is threatened with burdens on schools and social services. 
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However, the residents have to weigh the economic benefits and town revitalization that these 
industries bring to the rural town with the costs of growing immigrant populations. It is this 
conundrum that rural residents face on a daily basis. On the one hand, small towns are least 
susceptible to change, on the other if they want the economic advantages offered by meat plants 
they must adjust their expectations of what they think their community should look like.  I argue 
that some rural residents deal with their anxiety over immigrants by choosing to support local 
policies aimed specifically at deterring immigrants.   
 While my research examines immigration policy attitudes, there are examples of 
mistreatment of immigrants and racism in rural towns. There have been reports, in the Midwest, 
of Latino high-school students being victims of violence due to their nationality and being told 
by their Anglo schoolmates to “Go back to Mexico” (Millard et. al. 2004). In Central Iowa, for 
example, over 33 percent of Latinos confirmed that they had been mistreated at least once 
(Millard and Chapa 2004). This includes being turned down for social services, even when they 
were eligible, and discriminated against at the workplace, in schools, and places of worship.  
A survey study in Grand Island, Nebraska discovered that 60 percent of new immigrants 
felt they had been denied acceptable healthcare due to racism (Carranza 2004). This was a town 
my colleagues and I visited during our field work. In Grand Island, we received the most 
prejudice attitudes towards our study of Latinos and immigrants. One day, as we were picking up 
our survey at a home, which we had dropped off the day before, the resident handed us the 
pamphlet and simply said, “I’m not gonna lie, I hate Mexicans”. Indeed Latinos in rural areas 
often experience discrimination at work (Jefferds and Millard 2004), at school (Crane 2001), and 
in church (Crane and Millard 2004).  
 
15 
 
I argue that rural residents are more likely than urban residents to feel anxious about 
recent immigrants. The visible change, due to immigrants, in a small rural community makes 
them uneasy, especially for a population who favors the status quo.  
Previous studies that look at immigration policy preferences tend to focus on the 
characteristics of those who might support restrictive immigration policies. However, most do 
not include a measure of geographic location. This is an important characteristic to consider 
because of the different policy attitudes of rural and urban residents. I hypothesize that: 
H1: Rural residents will be more likely than urban residents to support restrictive state 
and local immigration policies.  
 
This is not unlike previous work that has examined the characteristics of individuals that 
support these types of policies. However, rather than focusing on socio-economic, partisan, or 
ideological differences in people, I focus on how geographic location can influence policy 
decisions. The traditional world-views of rural residents make them more likely to support 
restrictive immigration laws because they do not like change.  
Data and Methods 
I use data from two national polls conducted by professional polling firms. The two 
datasets were chosen specifically because of the questions included and the timing of the survey.  
I use the CBS/New York Times April 2010 and July 2010 Polls. Most importantly, the two 
surveys allow for consistency with the questions and controls I use in the analysis.  The surveys 
include the respondent’s geographic location: rural, suburb, medium-size city, and large-size 
city. Also, imperative to this study is that they both use a city’s population of under 50,000 
residents to signify that the respondent lives in a rural area. To accurately examine whether rural 
residents are significantly different than urban residents in their immigration policy preferences it 
was important that all the public opinion data I use be consistent with this rule. Furthermore, 
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additional controls that account for competing theories of why some individuals tend to support 
anti-immigration policies are also available in each survey and are measured consistently.  
First, I use the CBS News/New York Times April 2010 poll to suggest that rural residents 
are more likely to support state-wide anti-immigration legislation such as the controversial 
SB1070 law that was passed and signed in Arizona. The first of the two polls was conducted 
during the period from April 28, 2010-May 2, 2010. The respondents are all over 18 and were 
randomly selected by the use of random-digit dialing that included standard land lines and cell 
phone users. This methodology yielded a total sample of 1125 respondents.  
APRIL 2010 POLL 
The survey questions do not simply ask whether the respondent supports or does not 
support the law; instead it measures their attitude toward the implementation of the law. The 
dependent variable asks the respondent, 
“As you may know, the state of Arizona recently passed a law that gives the police the 
power to question anyone they suspect is in the country illegally, requires people to 
produce documents verifying their status if asked, and allows officers to arrest anyone 
who cannot do so. Do you think this law goes too far in dealing with the issue of illegal 
immigration, doesn't go far enough, or is it about right?” 
 
Even though this dissertation is about the likelihood of rural residents supporting local 
immigration ordinances in their community, I think this question is appropriate because it 
mentions several policies that would be employed by local police. First, it addresses whether 
local authorities should be allowed to question anyone they believe is in the country illegally. 
This part of the law has been one of the most contentious because of the racial component of 
suspicion. Latino advocacy groups argue that this will essentially allow local Arizona police to 
question Latinos and members of other ethnic and racial groups because of their skin color.  
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The second local policy component of this question is whether police should be able to 
ask for an individuals’ documentation and detain them if they are not in their possession. This 
part of the law essentially makes local law enforcement an arm of the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) agency. This ordinance would rest on the decision by the local officer to ask 
and detain someone without proper documentation and would presumably be made because of an 
individual’s accent or appearance.   
I coded the dependent variable as all those who responded that the law did not go far 
enough or was about right as 1, and individuals who thought the law went too far as 0. I included 
those who thought the law was about right and those who did not think it went far enough, 
because there is agreement between those two types of individuals that the policy should have 
been passed. Also, it clearly illustrates support for trying to change the immigration status quo by 
giving power to local authorities. I also use this question because I am confident this issue was in 
the minds of the respondents.  Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona signed SB1070 on April 23, 
2010, 5 days before this poll began. Therefore, I believe that most respondents had heard about 
this controversial law as the polling was taking place. This is substantiated by the fact that only 
63 respondents or 5.6% of the sample stated they did not know how they felt about the law.  
JULY 2010 POLL 
The second poll by CBS News/New York Times was conducted from July 5-July 8, 
2010. Like the previous April poll described above, the July 2010 poll also uses a random dialing 
system that contacts individuals that are over 18 via land lines and cell phone lines, this yielded a 
total sample of 1167.  
I use this poll to analyze whether rural residents are significantly more likely than urban 
residents to support a specific local immigration ordinance. This poll fits well for analyzing 
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support for local immigration ordinances because it questions whether or not respondents would 
favor or oppose local legislation in their town. The question states,  
“A Nebraska town recently passed an ordinance requiring businesses and landlords to 
verify that their employees and renters are in the United States legally in order to prevent 
illegal immigrants from finding jobs or places to live. Would you favor or oppose your 
own community adopting this policy?” 
 
This polling question also works well for this study because it was asked in July 2010 and 
the local ordinance that it addresses was passed in Fremont, Nebraska on June 21, 2010. 
Therefore, like the first dependent variable, the question is addressing an issue that was most 
salient for the time the poll was taken and should have been fresh in the minds of many 
respondents. This assertion stems from only 87 respondents or 7.5% of the total sample having 
no opinion on this question. Another advantage of using this question to address support for local 
laws is that the town in question, Fremont, is a rural town with a population under 50,000 
residents. In fact, it is a town that I visited for my field work that will be further discussed in later 
chapters. The wording of the question is interesting to me as well, since it states “A Nebraska 
town”. Perhaps the authors were trying to get their respondents to think of their own small town 
and how the demographics and culture of their town may be changing because of immigration.  
Independent Variables 
 
I analyze for geographic location with an independent variable, which is whether or not 
the respondent lives in a rural or suburban area. All respondents who live in medium or large 
cities are held as the baseline for comparison. Therefore, if a respondent lives in a rural area 
he/she was coded as 1 and all other respondents were coded as 0; the same was done for 
suburban residents. I included suburban residents in the analysis because some suburban cities 
with their own local government are under 50,000, but they are not located in rural areas, which 
are my focus, and I wanted to account for these differences.  
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The rest of the independent variables included in the analysis address socio-economic and 
political leanings, which are consistently found to influence attitudes towards immigration 
policy. The first control included addresses the race of the respondent. I use dichotomous 
measures of race for “whites” and “blacks”, with Latino excluded from the analysis to use as the 
comparison group. I expect white respondents to be more likely than Latinos to support anti-
immigrant measures, which they may help alleviate the “immigrant problem”. There is some 
evidence to support that blacks may be hostile to Latinos when there is competition between the 
groups (Gay 2006). Yet, blacks may feel like they are also the target of some of the racial 
components of these policies, in particular Arizona’s SB1070 policy, and therefore not be any 
more or less likely than Latinos to support such measures.  
I also include a control for gender where Females are coded as 1 and all men are coded as 
0. I expect women to be less supportive of anti-immigrant policies than men because of 
ideological and issue based gender gaps that have been increasing over time that suggest women 
to be more supportive of minorities and liberal issues (Norrander and Wilcox 2008). 
I next control for Age, Education, Income, and Marital Status. Age is an interval level 
variable that runs from 18 to 99. I expect that as age increases support for anti-immigrant 
policies will also increase. This would be consistent with previous immigration policy research 
(Fennelly and Federico 2008; Schildkraut 2011).  
Education, as we know, plays a significant role in how individuals react to policies and 
attitudes towards individuals. In my analysis, Education is measured on a 5-point scale. In this 
Likert scale, the lowest education level, no high school degree is equal to 1, and the highest 
education level, respondents with a professional/graduate degree are coded as 6. Fennelly and 
Federico (2008) point out that low levels of education are prevalent in rural areas, which might 
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help explain why some rural residents support immigration restrictions. I expect higher levels of 
education to be associated with lower levels of anti-immigrant policy support.   
I also account for Income because support for restrictive immigration policies may be a 
reflection of economic competition. Branton and Jones (2005) suggest that when there is a 
downturn in the economy, white backlash against minorities tends to increase. Since 2006, the 
national unemployment rate has fluctuated between 4-10% (U.S. Department of Labor 2012) 
depending on the state, city, and region. Since the United States has had less than exceptional 
economic numbers, I expect lower income respondents to be more likely to support anti-
immigrant policies because blue-collar workers may feel like they are in constant competition for 
jobs in this economy. To be consistent throughout the surveys, Income is coded as 1 for all 
respondents making more than $75,000 a year and 0 for those making under $75,000. I also use 
this coding scheme to maximize my sample population since over 100 respondents refused to 
provide their income status.  
Marital status is included in the analyses where respondents who are married were coded 
as 1 and those who are unmarried are coded as 0. This variable is added to account for the 
political influence a spouse can have on his/her significant other’s political leanings (Stoker & 
Jennings 2005).   
Finally, I include measures of partisanship and ideological leanings of the respondent. 
Partisanship and ideology are consistently strong predictors of whether or not an individual will 
be more likely to support or oppose immigrant policies. In a variety of studies, Republicans and 
Conservatives are found to be much more likely to support anti-immigrant legislation (Cirtin et. 
al. 1997; Hood III & Morris 1997; Brader et. al. 2008; Branton & Jones 2005; Fennelly and 
Federico 2008; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). I suspect this to be the case in this study as well. 
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Republican Partisanship is coded 1 for all respondents who identified as a Republican and 0 for 
all others who did not identify as a Republican. The control for Conservative ideology, like 
partisanship, is coded 1 for all respondents who identified as a Conservative and 0 for all others 
who did not identify as a conservative. In both cases, for Republicans and Conservatives, I 
expect that they will both be significant and positive in their support for restrictive immigration 
policies.  
Findings 
There are previous studies that look at immigration policy; yet, few take into account the 
differences in the rural and urban divide on immigration policy preferences. In the following 
analysis, I add to scholarly knowledge about the characteristics of those who are more likely to 
support local immigration ordinances. Further, what makes the models in this analysis 
particularly interesting to the study of immigration policy is that these are laws that have passed. 
Most studies that examine immigration preferences ask questions about federal immigration 
policy, yet, with the inaction of the federal government on immigration those studies only go so 
far as being hypotheticals. Looking at state and local laws that have passed through democratic 
processes provides a clearer picture of attitudes towards immigration policy than provided by a 
respondent’s preference of a hypothetical federal immigration law. Below are the logistic 
regression models that analyze support for local immigration policy.  
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In column 1, the rural variable illustrates that residents who live in rural areas are more 
likely than urban residents to say that they think the Arizona immigration law was about right or 
did not go far enough. This finding is statistically significant at the 0.05 level on a one-tailed test. 
Table 1.  
 
State & Local Immigration Policy Preferences 
 (1) 
Arizona Law 
Support=1 
(1a) 
Probability 
Change 
 
Min  Max 
(2) 
Fremont Housing 
Ordinance  
Support=1 
(2a) 
Probability 
Change 
 
Min  Max 
Rural 0.362* .07 0.539* .09 
 (0.205)  (0.250)  
     
Suburb 0.177  0.286  
 (0.169)  (0.227)  
     
White 0.583* .13 0.712* .12 
 (0.294)  (0.333)  
     
Black 0.550  0.0854  
 (0.406)  (0.414)  
     
Female -0.403* -.08 0.0697  
 (0.154)  (0.194)  
     
Age 0.0163* .26 0.00733  
 (0.00440)  (0.00565)  
     
Education -0.333* -.26 -0.249* -.18 
 (0.0686)  (0.0841)  
     
Income -0.165  -0.207  
 (0.177)  (0.295)  
     
Married 0.385* .08 0.681* .12 
 (0.158)  (0.203)  
     
Republican 0.887* .17 0.624* .10 
 (0.199)  (0.272)  
     
Conservative 1.571* .30 0.891* .16 
 (0.186)  (0.245)  
     
_cons -0.447  -0.310  
 (0.420)  (0.522)  
N 1031  1043  
adj. R2 0.1833  0.1269  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 
Source: 1: CBS/NYT April 2010 Poll One-tailed test 
Source 2: CBS/NYT July 2010 Poll  
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This means that I can be 95% sure that my models are not producing the coefficients by chance.  
Rural residents appear to be more willing to give local law enforcement the authority to question 
and detain individuals who they think may be illegal. Of course, this policy has major racial 
profiling implications. Officers are going to be much more likely to question the citizenship 
status of someone with brown skin and a Spanish accent than an individual with blonde hair and 
blue eyes. Since the passage of this law, the federal government has stepped in and the Supreme 
Court recently ruled that much of this law is unconstitutional. However, the fact that rural 
residents support these types of laws gives evidence to suggest that rural residents are tired of 
federal inaction on the issue of immigration and are willing to allow local police the power to 
enforce immigration laws.  
Logistic regression models allow us to determine whether or not a variable is associated 
with the dependent variable. Yet, they do little to allow us to draw conclusions on the strength of 
that independent variable on the dependent variable. To overcome this, I have included the 
predicted probabilities for the statistically significant variables in the model. Predicted 
probabilities tell us the average change in the dependent variable by the independent variable 
while holding all other factors constant. The predicted probabilities for Model 1 are listed in the 
column to the right under 1a.  
Keeping all other variables at their means, rural residents are, on average, 7% more likely 
than urban residents to support Arizona’s SB 1070 law. While this may not seem like a lot it is 
important to remember that predicted probabilities are measured on a 0-1 scale. Also, the 
controls included are variables that have been included in previous studies. The rural and urban 
divide is usually not included. Therefore, previous scholarly work has been missing an intricate 
piece to immigration policy studies due to geographic location.  
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Many of the controls included in Model 1 behaved as expected as well. Whites were 
more likely to support the Arizona law than Latinos. On average, whites support the Arizona law 
by 13% more than Latinos. Because of the racial component in this law, it makes sense that 
whites would be more favorable to it than Latinos. The ability for local law enforcement to be 
able to stop anyone they perceive to be illegal will largely fall on skin color. Indeed, Latinos 
would have to deal with this issue at a higher rate than whites which would lead them to dislike 
the law much more.  
According the model, men are more likely to support the law than women. I expected this 
to occur due to the gender gap on policies. Females are typically more nurturing and sympathetic 
to the less fortunate individuals and we may be seeing evidence of this in their immigration 
policy positions as well.  
Age and Education are both associated with support for the Arizona law. As expected, 
older individuals are more likely to favor the law. This may be because older respondents fear 
the changing demographics of the country. Younger generations are less supportive of the law, 
they may have friends or family members that are Latinos and may sympathize with them on 
racial profiling.  
Likewise, highly educated respondents may have more knowledge about the 
consequences of racial profiling and are therefore less supportive of the law. Looking at the 
predicted probabilities, the intensity of education on one’s decision making is clear: there is a 
26% decrease in probability of supporting Arizona’s SB1070 moving from the lowest educated 
respondents to the highest educated.  
The most strongly associated variables with support for immigration policies are 
partisanship and ideology.  On average, Republicans and Conservatives are 17% and 30% more 
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likely than other partisans and ideologues to support the Arizona law, respectively. This should 
not be surprising since Republicans and conservatives consistently show more support for 
policies that limit immigration. Further, the Arizona law was written by conservative 
Republicans in Arizona and subsequently signed by conservative Republican Governor Jan 
Brewer. Therefore, showing support for this law is not simply an indictment on immigration, but 
demonstrates support for fellow partisans and ideologues.  
Looking at Model 2, the results are similar in many ways.  The results suggest rural 
residents are significantly more likely to favor restrictions on local housing to undocumented 
immigrants than residents in urban areas. This finding is positive, in the expected direction, and 
statistically significant at the .05 level. As I previously mentioned, there have been number of 
rural towns that have passed local immigrant ordinances, but very few medium or large cities 
have passed these types of laws. Why is this?  
Brooks and Cheng (2001) suggest that when citizens feel like the federal government is 
not helping them with an issue that is important to them; they will have less trust in the federal 
government and attempt to address the issue with state and local government. I suggest this is 
what is occurring with the rural residents in my analysis. They believe there is a problem and the 
inability of the federal government to address this issue triggers an anxiety that drives them to try 
to address this issue with state and local policies. On average, rural residents are 9% more likely 
than urban residents to support local immigrant housing ordinances. This finding is especially 
notable because it is the first national public opinion analysis that examines attitudes towards a 
local immigration ordinance that has been passed. This ordinance has since been halted by 
federal court injunction, but it is important to recognize that the citizens of this town voted for 
this measure. This is what the citizens of this community wanted. Likewise, when a city council 
 
26 
 
passes an immigrant ordinance, this is democracy at work. This dissertation does not focus on 
what happened to the ordinance after subsequent passage, many of which have been subjected to 
court rulings. Instead, I am interested in the characteristics of individuals that support these types 
of laws and why.  
The control variables are in expected direction and several are significantly related to 
support for immigration housing ordinances. Whites, again, are more likely than Latinos to 
support local housing ordinances. Latinos are going to be more likely to know someone who may 
be undocumented so they may feel sympathetic to their cause. Conversely, white Americans are 
unaffected by these housing ordinances and thus supporting these types of ordinances is a way 
they can stop further migration into their town.  
Education is also associated with attitudes towards local immigration ordinances. The 
surveys do not have a measure for political knowledge; however, we can assume that higher 
educated individuals are more aware of the challenges presented when localities try to deal with 
federal law. The understanding of the political system and laws may be expressed through 
educated views on local immigration policies.  
Married respondents were more likely to support anti-immigrant ordinances in both 
models. I attribute this some men and women feeling threatened by immigrants and supporting 
the laws, in their mind, is protecting their family.  
At the local ordinance level, like the state level, Republican and conservative support is 
strong. Republicans are 10% more likely to support local housing ordinances than Democrats 
and Independents. Likewise, conservatives are 16% more likely than liberals or moderates to 
support this particular local immigration ordinance. Each of the variables in the model is being 
tested independently and the predicted probabilities display the average change in the dependent 
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variable while all other factors are held at their means. Yet, the impact of the variables cannot be 
understated. Republicans, conservatives, and rural residents are all highly correlated. Meaning 
rural residents are going to be highly likely to support local immigrant ordinances because they 
are likely to be republican and conservative.     
At the beginning of this chapter my aim was to build on previous studies on immigration 
policy by further examining the “who question”. By including location into immigration policy 
analysis, I am able to further studies on the characteristics of who might be more likely to 
support anti-immigrant policies. Overall, the models support my hypothesis and suggest that 
rural residents are significantly more likely to support state-wide laws like those enacted in 
Arizona and local ordinances that were passed in Fremont, NE.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I examined policy differences between rural and urban residents. Most 
studies that look at the types of people that support certain policies do not account for differences 
in geography. This is important due to the significant differences between rural and urban 
residents in many types of policy preferences. Rural residents tend to hold traditional world-
views that are different from urban residents. The “self-sort” that rural residents make is a 
calculated decision that makes them want to be further away from people who are not like them. 
Rural and urban differences in world-views translate into immigration policy preferences as well.  
I show that rural residents are more likely than urban residents to favor restrictive state 
and local immigration policies. This finding adds to scholarly knowledge of the characteristics of 
who are more likely to favor immigration restrictions. By adding geographic location, scholars 
are able to further examine why rural and urban differences are so prevalent across the U.S. 
Moreover, previous studies that analyze urban and rural immigration policy preferences rely on 
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support for federal immigration policies. It is clear that the gridlock in congress is stopping any 
type of comprehensive immigration reform. This study is an improved measure of the rural vs. 
urban divide on immigration because it analyzes immigration policies that have been passed 
recently. This allows scholars to make further generalizations about proponents and opponents of 
immigration legislation without using hypothetical situations such as federal laws.  
This study gives scholars a deeper breadth of the information about the types of 
individuals more likely to support restrictive immigration policies. Still, this study does not 
answer the “Why” question. Why are rural residents more likely than urban residents to support 
restrictive immigration policies? This is a question that many studies that look at demographic, 
socio-economic, partisan, and ideology tend to bypass. What are the mechanisms at work that are 
making rural residents significantly more supportive of restrictive immigration policy than urban 
residents? Using literature and theories from political psychology, in the next chapter I argue that 
rural residents are more likely than urban residents to exhibit feelings of anxiety, negative 
perceptions, and economic threat from immigrants. Taken together, these psychological feelings 
make rural residents feel uneasy and uncomfortable about immigrants and their growing 
population. Therefore, their decision to support anti-immigrant policies is based on sustaining 
their livelihood and quality of life. 
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Chapter 2: Rural & Urban Differences in Perception and Threat 
 
When analyzing certain policies it is important to include the context into which these 
policies are supported or opposed. I believe that immigration policy is a case where geographic 
and cultural context presents an interesting dynamic. Previous research demonstrates the impact 
of the rural-urban divide in American politics (Frank 2004; Gimple and Karnes 2006; Bishop 
2008; McKee 2008). These studies have generally come to the conclusion that rural towns and 
urban areas are significantly different because of the differences in social policy choices. 
Individuals in rural towns typically identify as white, conservative, and Republican whereas 
individuals in urban areas tend to be more liberal and diverse.  
These studies that analyze the rural-urban divide provide us with plenty of historically 
relevant information in regards to which individuals and towns decide to pass certain types of 
policies. Yet, much of this research has yet to investigate the psychological reasons as to why 
there is a rural and urban divide on individual issues. Analyzing immigration policy by location 
is important because the overwhelming majority of localities that have passed anti-immigrant 
ordinances are in small towns.  This study brings a unique perspective into why individuals in 
rural towns are more likely to support conservative policies, in particular, immigration policy. I 
agree with Gimple & Karnes (2006) that ideological conservatism dominates rural culture, 
however, when it comes to immigration policy in rural areas ideological conservatism does not 
answer the “why” question.  
In this study, the “why question” is interesting because most rural towns across the 
country are typically conservative and Republican strongholds (ibid; Fennelly & Federico 2008). 
If ideology was the primary driving force on city-level decision making of whether or not to 
support anti-immigrant ordinances, then most rural towns across the country would pass these 
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types of laws. Yet, only 47 rural towns across the country have passed an immigrant ordinance. 
Therefore conservative ideology is not the only driving force that influences why some 
individuals and towns are more likely to pass local immigration ordinances while others do not.  
Previous studies focus on attitudes towards federal laws and immigration reform. 
However, due to the inaction of the federal government on immigration there are many states and 
localities that have taken it upon themselves to pass local ordinances. Rather than focus on 
partisanship and ideology like most other studies, I argue that a where a person lives matters.  
Still, like most studies on immigration policy, I have simply illustrated the “Who” and not the 
“Why”. The “Who” question relates to the characteristics of whom might be more likely to 
support local immigration ordinances. “Why” rural residents more likely to support local 
immigration ordinances is an entirely different question altogether.  
I argue that rural residents are more likely to support local immigration ordinances 
because they are more likely to feel anxious and threatened by recent immigrants. Because of the 
dynamic of the small town (with few resources, jobs, and schools), rural residents are more likely 
than urban residents to feel like immigrants are everywhere and they feel bothered by the 
changes they see in their community. As anxiety increases, so too does the psychological 
feelings of threat by rural residents. They feel like their livelihood is threatened by immigrants 
because they perceive them to be abusers of the welfare system and criminals. I next examine 
these perceptions and sense of threat.  
Literature 
Anxiety and perception are the focal points of my argument throughout this dissertation. I 
argue that proximity in rural towns drives anxiety and negative perceptions of immigrants. My 
assumptions are based on the fact that rural towns are smaller locales and therefore more contact 
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and threat is occurring than in large urban areas. Not only is there more contact in rural areas, but 
the perception is negative and threatening to rural whites. I base part of my assumptions on the 
findings by Martinez and Valenzuela (2006). They find, for whites, proximity to immigrants 
leads to perceptions of immigrants as criminals. White respondents in their study feel that large 
populations or growing populations of immigrants near their homes increase levels of 
criminalization. Whether the crime rate of those towns actually increases are questionable, 
however, whites’ perception is that immigrants are the cause of the crime in their town. The 
perception of immigrants as criminals increases their feelings of threat. In this case, crime is a 
threat to the livelihood and well-being of the respondents and their families. In light of their 
study, I argue that feelings of threat due to immigrants shape their decision making processes on 
immigrant policies. Further, their study illustrates that proximity enhances their criminal 
perception of immigrants. In small towns, the geographic proximity to one’s neighbors is clearly 
enhanced due to the limited resources. Latino immigrants are typically associated with financial 
burdens when they are the subject of news stories. The negative coverage of Latino immigrants, 
as opposed to White European immigrants, adds to a perception of criminality. This increases 
feelings of anxiety and threat among Anglo-Americans (Brader et. al. 2008).   
Perception plays an intricate role in how an individual views his/her community. If they 
believe there are a lot of immigrants, if they believe they are criminals, and if they view them as 
a threat to their well-being then they will take action to try and curtail their immigrant problem. I 
argue that rural residents are more likely to have these perceptions than urban residents and this 
drives their support for anti-immigrant policies.  
The feelings of anxiety are central to my argument. Hartley & Phelps (2012, p. 113) 
argue, “anxiety may be experienced in the absence of a direct physical threat and typically 
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persists over a longer period of time. However, anxiety is commonly conceptualized as a state of 
sustained fear”.  In other words, anxiety occurs when an individual feels threatened, which does 
not have to be physically. When an individual is anxious they are living in a constant state of 
fear. I argue this is occurring in small rural towns across the country. They are witnessing quick 
changes in their community and it has them anxious about their well-being. I argue, rural 
residents are more likely to feel anxious about immigrants and therefore more likely to feel that 
their political power and economic well-being is threatened.  
Schildkraut (2011) also examines factors that might make whites anxious and uneasy 
about immigration. In a national survey, she finds that whites who exhibit ethno-cultural 
tendencies are more likely to favor strict immigration policies (ibid p.190). By ethno-cultural she 
refers to whites who resent “immigrants for being non-white and non-Christian” (ibid p.182).  
Schildkraut argues that ethno-cultural resentment occurs because some whites feel like their 
American identity and culture is being threatened. This is a good example of how non-physical 
threats may influence policy attitudes. In her example, whites are anxious because they feel like 
their American identity and culture is being threatened by an outside foreign influence. This 
anxiety shapes their policy decision-making process in how they view immigration policy.  
I agree with the premise of Schildkraut’s study and argue that we can take it further by 
analyzing rural residents. Schildkraut does not look into whether her respondent’s location 
shapes their attitudes towards immigrants. I think this is an important and understudied area of 
policy studies.  Demographic and social changes in rural towns will be more noticeable to the 
naked eye than demographic and social changes in large cities, therefore I argue that, rural 
residents will feel more anxious about their American identity and culture than urban residents 
and therefore be more likely to support anti-immigrant ordinances.  
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Anxiety about Immigrants 
Data & Methods: Anxiety 
In order to illustrate that rural residents are more anxious about immigrants than urban 
residents, I needed to find a national survey that includes variables that control for location and 
questions regarding immigrants. I found this in the 2006 Pew Hispanic Immigration Survey. The 
data was collected by telephone by the Pew Hispanic Center from February 8-March 7, 2006. 
The survey is a nation-wide sample of 2,000 adults over the age of 18. This survey is unique in 
the fact that it oversamples the urban areas of Chicago, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Raleigh-Durham, 
and Washington D.C. This survey is also very useful because it was conducted around the time 
of the 2006 immigration debate. During this time, President George W. Bush attempted to gain 
support for comprehensive immigration reform, however, his attempts were attacked by his own 
party. The Republicans claimed immigration reform meant citizenship for law breakers. To 
counter this point, pro-immigration movements sprouted across the country culminating in a 
series of protests in support of comprehensive immigration reform (Barreto et. al., 2009). By 
using this particular dataset, I am able to assume that a wide audience had been informed or at 
least aware of immigration stories and headlines. 
To demonstrate feelings of anxiety, I must first review whether or not rural residents 
perceive immigrants to be in their community. Perception is key in my analysis. To feel anxious 
and threatened, individuals must perceive that immigrants are drastically changing their 
community. Just by sheer numbers, we know that there are more immigrants in urban areas, yet, 
if rural residents perceive more immigrants in their community than urban residents do, this 
perception (being over-run with newcomers and fear of the unknown) will increase anxiety. 
Therefore I hypothesize: 
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H2: Respondents who live in rural towns will be more likely than urban respondents to 
perceive that there are many immigrants in their town 
 
For my dependent variables, I use two questions that measure perception of immigrants 
in the respondent’s community. The first question asks,  
“How many recent immigrants would you say live in your area…Many (4), Some (3), 
Only A Few (2), or None (1)” 
 
This question specifically asks the respondent to think about how many immigrants live 
in their area.  This is important because in psychology a person’s perception does not have to 
accurately represent reality. In a small town, I expect rural residents’ perception of immigrants to 
be higher than in urban areas because small towns limit the number of places one can go to buy 
groceries, eat, worship, ect…Therefore, if there is a perception amongst rural residents that there 
are “many” immigrants in their area these feelings will increase anxiety.  
The second question I include analyzes perceived contact with immigrants. This focuses 
on the respondent’s perception of contact with immigrants who speak little or no English,  
“How often do you personally come in contact with immigrants who speak little or no 
English…Often (4), Sometimes (3), Rarely (2), or Never (1).” 
 
It is impossible to quantify exactly how many non-English speakers there are in a given 
city, however, this question is focused on what the respondent believes. I hypothesize that: 
H3: Rural residents will be more likely than urban residents to believe they come into 
contact more often with immigrants who speak little or no English. 
 
What a person believes to be true is of course associated with feelings of anxiety. People 
become anxious for numerous reasons: spiders are scary, stage-fright, test-taking, or simply fear 
of the unknown (Hembree 1988). Anxiety comes from fear of the unexpected and unknown, 
rural residents are more likely than urban residents to exhibit these feelings about immigrants.  
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The numbers inside the parentheses represent how each answer was coded for my 
analysis, therefore, the higher the number the higher the perception of immigrants in the 
respondent’s community or the perception of contact.  
Independent Variables 
My key independent variable in this analysis is the location where the respondent 
currently resides. In this dataset, they include a measure for residents who live in an urban, a 
suburban, or a rural location. I am confident that their measurements are accurate because the 
dataset also includes the respondent’s zip code. After reviewing many zip codes, it was apparent 
that the zip code appropriately matched the respondent’s location area. Since location is a 
nominal variable, I include Rural and Suburban in the analysis while keeping Urban as the 
baseline. This means that the analysis in the table will be comparing attitudes of rural residents to 
attitudes of urban residents. This Pew’s location variable works well with my analysis because 
throughout my research I quantify “Rural2” as a town that is not near a big city and has a total 
population of less than 50,000. In this dataset, like the CBS/NYT polls used above, the 
measurement for “Rural” is someone who lives in a town below a population of 50,000. 
Therefore, the measurements I use throughout this dissertation are consistent.  
The rest of the variables included in the analysis address race, gender, socio-economic 
and political leanings since these controls are consistently found to influence attitudes towards 
immigration policy.  
Age is an interval level variable that runs from 18 to 99. Age is an interesting variable for 
this analysis because older citizens might be more likely to believe that the demographics of the 
country has changed quickly and therefore perceive lots of immigrants in their area and contact 
with them.  
                                                 
2 All rural variables throughout the this dissertation are located in towns with a total population under 50,000. 
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Education, as we know, plays a significant role in how individuals react to policies, 
opinions, and attitudes towards individuals. In the analysis Education is coded from 0-6 where 
respondents who have an education level between 1st-8th grade or below are coded as 0 and 
respondents who have a post graduate degree are coded as 6.  
Income is an important control to include because economic competition may be a reason 
why respondents feel there are too many immigrants in their area. A common problem when 
including income in a public opinion survey is the amount of respondents who choose not to 
disclose this information to the interviewer. To overcome this problem, I have coded all 
respondents who reported to make over $75,000/year as 1 and all others as 0, doing this will 
allow me to include as much of the sample population as possible. Another economic indicator, 
Employment Status is also included in this analysis. Those individuals who report having a full-
time job are coded as 1 and all others are coded as 0.  
Marital status is included in all three analyses where respondents who are married were 
coded as 1 and those who are unmarried are coded as 0. This is included because having a family 
may indirectly affect what you think of your community and neighborhood’s residents.  
Finally, I include two measures of partisanship and ideological leanings of the 
respondent. Partisanship is coded 1 for all respondents who identified as a Republican and 0 for 
all others who did not identify as a Republican. The control for ideology, like partisanship, is 
coded 1 for all respondents who identified as a conservative and 0 for all others who did not 
identify as a conservative. For Republicans and Conservatives, I expect that they will both be 
significantly more likely in their support for restrictive immigration policies because of previous 
voting patterns.  
Findings 
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Since the dependent variable runs on a four-point scale, I analyze the two questions using 
an ordinal logistic regression model. Table 2 includes four columns. Column 1 represents the 
coefficients of the independent variables and control variables on the dependent variable, which 
is the respondent’s perception of how many recent immigrants are in his/her community. The 
next column, which I have labeled 1a, represents the predicted probability of the statistically 
significant variables in column 1. I only include variables where we see significant changes in 
the dependent variables because otherwise the variable change from its minimum to its 
maximum is not statistically different from zero. The second model in the table, labeled 2, 
illustrates the coefficients for the independent and control variables for the dependent variable, in 
which respondents answered their perceived contact with limited English speakers. The final 
column to the right, labeled 2a, demonstrates the actual changes in the dependent variable given 
the change of the statistically significant independent variables and controls. 
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Table 2. National Public Opinion on Immigrant Perceptions 
 (1) 
Recent 
immigrants 
in your 
area? 
(1a) 
Probability 
Change 
 
MinMax 
(2) 
Contact with 
non-English 
speakers? 
 
(2a) 
Probability 
Change 
 
Min  Max 
Rural 0.467* .06 0.678** .08 
 (0.199)  (0.210)  
     
Suburb -0.135  -0.169  
 (0.0939)  (0.102)  
     
White -0.285  -0.288  
 (0.149)  (0.162)  
     
Black 0.119  -0.203  
 (0.184)  (0.204)  
     
Female -0.0141  0.000477  
 (0.0900)  (0.0986)  
     
Age 0.00508  0.0115*** .11 
 (0.00311)  (0.00335)  
     
Education -0.0854** .06 0.0339  
 (0.0301)  (0.0329)  
     
Income 0.0966  0.0640  
 (0.107)  (0.116)  
     
Employed 0.0558  -0.109  
 (0.108)  (0.116)  
     
Marital 0.132  0.0440  
Status (0.0950)  (0.104)  
     
Republican 0.0305  0.144  
 (0.107)  (0.114)  
     
Conservative -0.0674  -0.00925  
 (0.0994)  (0.107)  
     
_cut1 -0.171  1.090***  
 (0.258)  (0.287)  
     
_cut2 1.018***  2.479***  
 (0.259)  (0.293)  
     
_cut3 2.842***  4.327***  
 (0.277)  (0.327)  
N 1862  1860  
Pseudo R2 .0084  .0117  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Source: 2006 Pew Hispanic Imm. Survey 
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The models in Table 2 support my hypothesis. Rural residents are more likely than urban 
residents to perceive that they are coming into contact with immigrants more often. In Model 1, 
the question addressed how many recent immigrants the respondent believed to live in their area. 
Empirical studies illustrate that immigrants are much more likely to live in large urban/metro 
areas (Bartel 1989), yet, I hypothesized that rural residents would believe their area has become 
home to more recent immigrants than urban residents. The model indicates that my hypothesis is 
correct and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This means that I can be 95% confident that 
I am not calculating these results by chance. Rural residents are statistically different than urban 
residents. Respondents in rural areas, on average, believe that there are more recent immigrants 
in their area than urban respondents. Realistically, we know there are more immigrants in urban 
areas than in rural areas. Yet, because of the small town dynamic, there is a perception of their 
town being home to “many” immigrants. I argue this drives why rural residents may be more 
likely to support anti-immigrant policies. While immigrants tend to move to urban areas, rural 
residents perceive there to be more immigrants in their area because of the size of their town. As 
I stated above, small towns are limited in their resources: schools, places of worship & 
entertainment, and grocery stores. These limited resources enhance the perception that “many” or 
“some” recent immigrants have come into the rural resident’s community.  
It is worth noting that none of the other control variables included in Model 1 are 
statistically significant except education. This variable suggests that respondents are less likely to 
believe that many recent immigrants are in their area when education levels rise. This might 
occur because college graduates and respondents with professional degrees are less threatened by 
immigrants. Individuals with professional degrees would be less likely to compete with 
immigrants for scarce resources, like jobs, than respondents of lower education backgrounds.   
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The limitation of the models used in Table1 is that the coefficients do not tell us the 
substantive effects of the variables. In an ordinal logistic model, the coefficients mean little to 
the naked eye in terms of the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. To overcome this issue, I have included the predicted probabilities for the statistically 
significant variables in column 1a. I only included the predicted probabilities for significant 
variables because they illustrate a statistically substantive effect on the dependent variable.  The 
predicted probabilities are interpreted from zero to one because of the logistic function used in 
for the model. Finally, the number in column 1a is the predicted probability when the variable 
changes from its minimum variable to its maximum value. For example, in both models, rural is 
equal to one and urban resident is the baseline variable that is equal to zero. Therefore a change 
from the minimum to the maximum in my independent variable would be from zero to one.  
 The predicted probabilities in column 1a suggest that, on average, rural residents are 
0.06 or 6% more likely than urban residents to believe that there are many or some recent 
immigrants in their area. This change in probability between rural and urban residents is taken 
when all other factors in the model are held at their means. Education also yields a minimum to 
maximum change of 6% on the dependent variable, all else equal. Looking closer into both 
variables3, geographic location is the strongest predictor in this model. This is because the 
minimum value of education 1 ranges to the maximum value of 7. Therefore, the effect of a 
change in one education level is not as strong as the change in rural to urban. For example, the 
minimum to maximum coefficient suggests that a respondent who has little to no education 
would have to graduate with a professional degree to equal the substantive effect of the 
rural/urban independent variable. Looking at probabilities as they compare to each other 
illustrates the strength of my key independent variable. Living in a rural area rather than an urban 
                                                 
3 The appendix includes figures with the marginal effects of significant variables. 
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area provides the most significant change on the dependent variable, the perception of recent 
immigrants in the respondent’s community.  
The second model included in Table 2, depicted under column 2, examines how 
frequently the respondent feels he/she comes into contact with limited English speakers. The 
models include the same independent variables as model 1. While this question does not ask 
about whether or not the immigrant is Spanish dominant, Spanish is the most likely form of 
“other language” in the United States. According to a 2013 study by the United States census, 
there were over 60 million people who indicated that they speak a language other than English at 
home. Over 62% or approximately 37 million of these individuals stated that Spanish was the 
language other than English spoken at home. Therefore, while it is impossible to say for certain 
that contact with the limited English speaker was because the individual was Spanish dominant, 
it is highly likely. Again, we would expect more people with limited English skills to live in 
urban areas since most immigrants live in cities. However, if there is a perception among rural 
residents that they come into to contact with limited English speakers often. I argue this 
contributes to their rural support for anti-immigrant policies.  
My hypothesis is substantiated by the findings in model 2. The rural variable suggests 
that respondents who live in rural areas are significantly more likely than urban respondents to 
believe they come into contact with limited English speakers more frequently. Like the findings 
in model 1, I attribute much of this perceived contact due to the limited areas available in a small 
rural town. Urban areas are still highly segregated by residential neighborhoods (Lipsitz 1998). 
There are more opportunities for residents to live, work, and play in the comfort of their urban 
neighborhoods and districts. There are fewer opportunities in small towns. I lived in a small town 
for over a year. This community had a total population of fewer than 40,000. In this town there 
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was one Wal-Mart and one Dillon’s Supermarket. These were the only two options available to 
the thousands that lived there to buy groceries. There was one high school and one middle 
school, a movie theater with 6 screens, one city-owned recreation park, one small clinic, 
ect…Therefore, in a small community the contact with limited English speakers, especially in a 
meat-packing town like this one, is going to be higher than urban areas. Whether or not that is 
true in all small towns is unknown, however, because of the small fishbowl rural residents live in 
they perceive that they are coming into contact with limited English speakers at higher rates than 
urban residents. This finding is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
Like model 1, there is only one other variable that is significant in model 2, however, this 
time it is not education, but age. As age increases, older respondents believe they come into 
contact with limited English speakers at higher rates than younger respondents. I would guess 
this occurs because younger respondents are more likely to hang around friends their age who 
have been taught English in school or acquired English language skills at an early age. 
Conversely, older immigrants are less likely to have English fluency because they lack the 
schooling needed to develop language acquisition (LNS 2006). Therefore, nationally, older 
respondents are more likely to come into contact with other older residents because of their jobs, 
religion, and common interests that differ from younger generations.   
Model 2 is also an ordinal logistic model and the reported coefficients are difficult to 
examine the substantive impact of the variables on the dependent variable. To alleviate this 
problem, I again included the predicted probabilities for both statistically significant variables.  
The rural variable moving from its minimum of zero (urban resident) to its maximum of one 
(rural resident) exhibits an 8% change in the probability. This means on average, rural residents 
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are 8% more likely than urban residents to think that they into contact more often with limited 
English speakers.  
Column 2a also demonstrates that age significantly effects a large change in the 
dependent variable. A change in age from its minimum of 18 to its maximum of 97 yields an 
overall change in the dependent variable of 11%. This might seem large, but the large range of 
years in the survey illustrates that very small changes in the dependent variable are made moving 
from one year to the next. Therefore, the marginal effects are quite small. The strongest predictor 
in whether or not the respondent believes he/she comes into frequent contact with a limited 
English speaker is geographic location.  
Obviously, not all contact is bad. There are many people around the country who will 
gladly help out a fellow resident struggling with our native tongue.  However, many people 
might feel bothered or annoyed when they come into contact with someone that has limited 
English skills. I think many of us can remember an instance where a cashier, a waitress, or other 
service jobs where there has been an interaction between an English speaker and a limited or 
non-English speaker. Have you ever wondered what the person speaking fluent English was 
thinking throughout the episode? Some may be helpful and try to explain a menu or type of 
prescription drug, but others may be annoyed and bothered by such an occasion. Some 
individuals may come into contact with residents of limited English skills frequently and they 
may be bothered by it every time. If this sequence occurs regularly, I argue, anxiety builds inside 
the individual that sees foreigners as a nuisance. I test this theory using a follow-up question 
given in the 2006 Pew Hispanic survey. In the survey, the interviewer asks the respondent how 
frequently he/she believes they come into contact with an immigrant with little or no English 
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skills, this was illustrated above. However, after the respondent answers this question the 
interviewer follows up on the question and asks:  
“When that happens, does it bother you, or not bother you?” 
This question taps directly into whether or not the respondent is annoyed at the contact 
with a limited English speaker or not. Feelings of “being-bothered” are important in this question 
and in studies of causes of psychological anxiety. Research suggests that when individuals are 
bothered by life experiences, they become worried about situations around them and therefore 
they are more likely to exhibit symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) (Wells 2005). I 
illustrated above that rural residents are more likely than urban residents to believe that they 
come into contact more often with immigrants of little to no English skills. If rural residents are 
also feeling more bothered by this interaction with limited English speakers than urban residents, 
then this allows me to further generalize that rural residents are exhibiting more feelings of 
anxiety about immigrants than urban residents and thus contributing to their local anti-immigrant 
policy choices. I hypothesize: 
H4: Rural residents will be more likely than urban residents to feel bothered when they 
come into contact with a limited English speaker. 
 
Using the same 2006 Pew Hispanic Immigration Survey, I examine a model illustrating 
what types of individuals are more likely to feel bothered about coming into contact with 
immigrants with little to no English skills. Because the question asks whether the respondent 
feels bothered or not, I use a logistic model to examine my dependent variable where “Being 
Bothered=1” and “Not Being Bothered=0”. Included in the model are all the same independent 
variables used in Table 2.  
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As far as the number of variables that are statistically significant, Table 3 is much more 
active than the models in Table 2. The key independent variable is, again, statistically significant 
in this model. This illustrates that, on average, rural residents are more likely than urban 
Table 3. Respondent anxiety when they come  
in contact with a limited English speaker 
 (1) 
How does contact 
make you feel? 
Bothered=1 
(1a) 
Probability Change 
 
Min  Max 
Rural 0.525* .13 
 (0.254)  
   
Suburb 0.360*** .09 
 (0.107)  
   
White 0.586*** .15 
 (0.178)  
   
Black 0.396  
 (0.219)  
   
Female 0.216* .05 
 (0.104)  
   
Age 0.00422  
 (0.00354)  
   
Education -0.0271  
 (0.0347)  
   
Income -0.154  
 (0.122)  
   
Employed -0.109  
 (0.123)  
   
Marital -0.106  
Status (0.109)  
   
Republican 0.340** .08 
 (0.122)  
   
Conservative 0.310** .07 
 (0.113)  
   
_cons -0.908**  
 (0.299)  
N 1622  
Pseudo R2 .317  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: 2006 Pew Hispanic Imm. Survey 
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residents to feel bothered when they come into contact with a limited English speaker. This 
finding is intriguing because this is the first instance where we see various statistically significant 
controls, many of which are known to affect attitudes towards immigrants, yet, “Rural” remains 
a strong predictor of anxiety towards immigrants. The rural variable, throughout the three models 
has remained the single constant predictor of immigrant perception and anxiety. This gives me 
confidence in the robustness of my findings in all three models.  
Looking at the controls, there is plenty of noteworthy findings. First, it appears that rural 
residents are not the only respondents in a geographic location that seem bothered by immigrants 
with little or no English speaking skills. The model illustrates that respondents who live in 
suburban areas are also more likely than urban residents to feel bothered by limited English 
speaking immigrants. Historically, white flight from the cities to the suburbs has occurred 
because it gave white residents the option to move away from minorities who were 
predominately located in the city (Lipsitz 1998). Therefore, suburban residents who chose to 
move out of the city and into the suburbs may be bothered by limited English speaking 
immigrants because they purposefully moved away from the city so they would not be put into 
that situation. Conversely, those living in urban areas may not be as bothered as rural residents 
and suburbanites when they come into contact with an immigrant with limited speaking skills 
because of the diversity in large cities and it may not be something new to them.  
Race is also a predictor of who might be more likely to feel bothered by an immigrant 
with limited speaking skills. The model illustrates that whites are more likely to be bothered by 
this type of contact than Hispanics. This would traditionally make sense since Hispanics would 
seem to be more sympathetic to those who struggle with the English language because they may 
deal with it themselves or have a close friend or relative who struggles with the language. There 
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was no statistically significant difference between Hispanics and blacks. This may be because 
blacks who also tend to live in the city and may not be surprised when they come into contact 
with an immigrant with little English skills because it is not a new phenomenon to them.  
The model illustrates a gender difference in who might be more likely to feel bothered by 
limited English immigrants. Females, on average, are more likely to be bothered by this type of 
contact. Unfortunately, the survey does not ask characteristics of the immigrant that the 
respondent typically comes into contact with, i.e. male or female, or where the contact may have 
occurred, social places or places of employment. Above, I tried to paint the picture of an instance 
where you may have witnessed a service worker trying to communicate with a limited English 
speaker. Most of the industries I mentioned are customer based face-to-face jobs. Women are 
more likely to have these types of customer-service based jobs because companies feel a 
woman’s voice and persona is more inviting to customers (Bradley et. al. 2000). Therefore, 
females may be more bothered by immigrants who speak little to no English because they 
experience it more often than men. 
Partisanship and ideology are also statistical predictors on attitudes towards limited 
English language speakers. The model suggests that Republicans and Conservatives, on average, 
are more likely to be bothered by having contact with immigrants who have little or no English 
speaking skills than Democrats & Independents and Liberals & Moderates. This finding is 
consistent with most research on attitudes towards immigrants. However, most research looks at 
attitudes dealing with stereotypes and policy; this adds a new dimension to scholarly research by 
addressing the feelings held by respondents when they come into contact with immigrants.  
This is an area of research on immigrants that tends to get overlooked. Previous studies 
certainly address the “who” question. “Who” is more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant attitudes? 
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But they deal little with the “why”. This model adds to their work and suggests that some 
individuals, because of their location, race, gender, partisanship, or ideology are more likely to 
harbor anti-immigrant attitudes because they feel bothered and anxious about them.  
Looking at the predicted probabilities column in Table 3, two variables stick out. Holding 
all other variables constant, rural residents are 13% more likely than urban residents to feel 
bothered when they come into contact with a limited English speaker. This is a significant impact 
on the dependent variable. Most studies on immigrant attitudes do not include variables that 
control for a respondent’s location; they are missing a large segment in their analysis of “who” 
are the types of people that harbor anti-immigrant sentiments. The race variable that compared 
whites and Hispanic was the only other variable in the model that had a stronger overall impact 
on the dependent variable. We would expect there to be a large difference between these two 
groups because of familiarity and sympathy for those who struggle with the English language 
illustrated by Hispanics. Interesting to note, in the survey, 88% of the rural respondents are 
white. Therefore, while the race variable may be a stronger predictor on the dependent variable, 
rural whites would seem to be the most bothered by having contact with immigrants to speak 
little or no English.  
Perception & Threat of Immigrants 
In tables 2 and 3, I have tried to demonstrate that there is an active perception among 
rural residents that they believe immigrants are sprawling in their area, more so than urban 
residents. Those rural residents not only believe that there are a lot of recent immigrants in their 
area, but they also perceive themselves to come into contact with immigrants to speak little to no 
English more frequently than urban residents. 
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People do not live in rural towns for progressive change and ideas. They believe in the 
status quo. They live there because of their family ties, customs, and culture. Therefore, when it 
is perceived that their culture is changing they become bothered by it. It makes them feel uneasy 
and therefore anxious. Feelings of anxiety are typically caused because of the unknown. People 
are generally afraid of what they are not accustomed to (Hartley & Phelps 2012). They become 
fearful because they feel that their livelihood is threatened by immigrants who they believe 
increase crime, take jobs away from white Americans, and change American culture.  
Evidence of threat felt by whites is well documented by Schildkraut’s (2011) Twenty-
First-Century Americanism Survey and subsequent book, Americanism in the Twenty-First 
Century: Public Opinion in the Age of Immigration. She details why whites are more likely to 
support anti-immigrant policies and express negative stereotypes about immigrants. She suggests 
this occurs because whites are threatened they are losing their American culture. I agree with her 
findings, however, she does not look into whether the sense of threat exhibited by respondents is 
equal to respondents in all geographic locations.  She does use a geographic indicator that 
measures the % Hispanic and % Asian in the respondent’s zip code, but I believe this differs 
from the perception that some rural whites have that “many” or “a lot” of recent immigrants are 
in their town.  
Using a respondent’s zip code as a measurement of Hispanics and Asians does accurately 
reflect census reality, but it does not reflect what the individual believes to be true. This is why I 
argue taking a respondent’s perception of what they believe to be occurring in their town is more 
interesting when looking at anti-immigrant sentiment and threat. Further, while she does include 
the respondent’s zip code, she does not subdivide her respondents by geographic location. 
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Looking at geographic location for respondents is relevant because there are historical 
differences-mentioned above-between rural and urban residents in their political choices.  
Data & Methods: Perception & Threat 
The 2006 Pew Immigration survey includes three questions that I use to examine feelings 
of threat and loss. I look at feelings of threat using questions that analyze how immigrants have 
impacted the respondent’s job opportunities, quality of life, and perception of crime. These are 
not unlike previous studies on immigrant threat (Hood III & Morris 1997; Brader et. al. 2008; 
Branton & Jones 2005; Gay 2006), but I add the respondent’s geographic location. This 
characteristic plays a significant role in threat feelings. Urban residents may be used to seeing 
immigrants in their community and therefore not as threatened by them. Conversely, rural 
residents may view immigrants as a relatively new phenomenon and weary of the changes they 
bring to their community. Therefore, I hypothesize  
H5: Rural residents will be more likely than urban residents to feel like immigrants are 
threatening their job opportunities, quality of life, and their family’s well-being. 
 
The questions posed by the interviewers, I feel, accurately capture beliefs by the 
respondent in how they feel immigrants have changed their community. Again, perception plays 
an intricate role in why I argue rural residents are more likely to support anti-immigrant policies 
and ordinances.  Whether or not the perception matches the reality is inconsequential to the 
respondent, if they believe immigrants are threatening their livelihood, they will make their 
policy preferences with their well-being in mind. The first question analyzing whether the 
respondent feels threatened by immigrants in their job opportunities asks,   
“Do you believe that you or a family member has ever lost a job or not gotten a job 
because an employer hired immigrant workers instead, or don’t you think so?” 
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The common argument used by opponents of immigration reform is that immigrants are 
taking jobs from Americans. Of course, it is impossible to know for sure whether or not the 
respondent or his/her family member lost the job because of an immigrant, yet, this question is 
asking the respondent who they believe is to blame. This is a question that measures the 
respondent’s perception of who took his/her job. This question is measured with a logistic model 
where “Yes=1”, the respondent believes he/she or a family member lost a job or did not get a job 
because of an immigrant, and “No=0” the respondent does not believe an immigrant is to blame. 
The next question measures the respondent’s view of their local government services 
since the arrival of newer immigrants. The question states,  
“Thinking about all of the immigrants who have moved into your community in recent 
years: What effect, if any, do you think these recent immigrants are having on the quality 
of your local government services? Are they making things better, making things worse 
or not making much difference either way?” 
 
This is an interesting question because it can be interpreted in many ways depending on 
how the respondent reads it and depending on what is important in the respondent’s life. First of 
all, I think it is important that the question makes the respondent think about “immigrants who 
have moved into [their] community in recent years”. I believe the authors of the survey do this to 
eliminate any thoughts by the respondent that “immigrant” could mean immigrants from the 
early 20th century i.e. Germans, Polish, and Jews. The second part of the question is up to the 
respondent to think about what local government services are important to him/her and whether 
the quality of those services has gotten better or worse due to recent immigrants. Local 
government services can have a lot of variability: police, health services, schools, local 
government construction, social services, bus services, and the fire department just to name a 
few. We do not know what is important to the respondent, but I think by grouping all these local 
government services together, we can get an idea of whether or not the individual believes their 
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local quality of life has gotten better or worse. There is variability associated with this question 
by giving the respondent the option to choose “not making much difference either way”, so I 
have decided to drop this option from my analysis. I do this so I can have my respondents make a 
clear cut choice. I code the respondent’s choices as their local quality of services has gotten 
Worse=1 or Better=0 since the arrival of recent immigrants.  
Finally, I examine what types of individuals view immigrants as a cause of crime. This is 
a frequent component in the immigration debate. Many opponents argue that immigration reform 
would be bad for the country because immigrants increase crime. Almost daily, people are 
inundated with news and media stories detailing drug cartels in Mexico and Central America. 
These images portray individuals from these nations of origin in a negative light, assuming that 
all immigrants are violent, drug abusers, and drug-traffickers. The question in the survey that 
addresses this issue asks,  
“Please tell me whether each of the following characteristics do or do not apply to 
immigrants from Latin American countries… Significantly increase crime.” 
 
This question is a little bit different than the others used in this dissertation thus far. 
There were several characteristics that were asked to the respondent by the interviewer. Each 
characteristic was randomized so not all respondents answered this particular question. For this 
project, I am only interested in which types of respondents believe that immigrants from Latin 
American countries significantly increase crime. While all other questions used up until now 
have asked about immigrants in general, this is the first that specifies immigration from Latin 
America. This is very helpful for this type of question because of the negative media attention 
that is typically associated with Latin American drug cartels and crime. The increase in crime is 
a threat to the overall well-being of the respondent and his/her family. If the individual believes 
that Latin American immigrants significantly increase crime, then it would not be difficult to 
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imagine that such a person would also support anti-immigrant policies too, which in their 
perception would decrease crime. I also use a logistic model for this question and I quantify all 
the respondents who believe that the characteristic of Latin American immigrants significantly 
increases crime Applies=1 and those who believe it Does Not Apply=0.  
Findings 
The models for all three dependent variables mentioned above and the predicted 
probabilities for each model are found in Table 4. All three of the models are analyzed using 
logistic regression and I have coded each so that negative beliefs about immigrants equal positive 
coefficients. 
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Threat of Job Loss 
Table 4. National Public Opinion on Immigrant Threat 
 (1)  
Lost a job 
to 
immigrant? 
Yes=+ 
(1a) 
Probability 
Change 
 
Min Max 
(2)  
Immigrant effect 
on quality of 
local services 
Worse=+ 
(2a) 
Probability 
Change 
 
Min  Max 
(3)  
Lat. Am. 
Immigrant 
Characteristic: 
increase crime 
Applies=+ 
(3a) 
Probability 
Change 
 
Min  Max 
       
Rural 0.499* .10 0.946* .10 0.642+ .15 
 (0.240)  (0.391)  (0.358)  
       
Suburb 0.212+ .04 0.104  0.244  
 (0.120)  (0.130)  (0.151)  
       
White 0.240  1.145* .19 0.217  
 (0.192)  (0.175)  (0.235)  
       
Black 0.730* .15 1.220* .12 0.508+ .12 
 (0.224)  (0.230)  (0.296)  
       
Female 0.123  0.191  -0.259+ -.06 
 (0.113)  (0.128)  (0.147)  
       
Age -0.0117* -.16 0.0281* .27 0.00982+ .19 
 (0.00379)  (0.00444)  (0.00509)  
       
Education -0.138* -.15 0.0496  -0.0966* -.14 
 (0.0366)  (0.0413)  (0.0476)  
       
Income -0.626* -.10 0.142  -0.137  
 (0.146)  (0.153)  (0.171)  
       
Employed -0.234+ -.04 -0.0588  -0.549* -.13 
 (0.131)  (0.154)  (0.175)  
       
Marital -0.281* -.05 0.301* .04 -0.174  
Status (0.116)  (0.132)  (0.155)  
       
Republican -0.286* -.05 0.479* .06 0.553* .14 
 (0.138)  (0.162)  (0.170)  
       
Conservative 0.0619  0.356* .04 0.215  
 (0.123)  (0.145)  (0.156)  
       
_cons 0.136  -1.688*  0.0935  
 (0.308)  (0.328)  (0.411)  
N 1862  1862  849  
Pseudo R2 .0606  .1035  .0552  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 
Source: 2006 Pew Hispanic Imm. Survey 
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Model 1 illustrates that respondents who live in rural areas are significantly more likely 
to believe they or a family member has lost a job or not gotten a job because of an immigrant. 
Geographic location is rarely addressed when looking at threat theory and attitudes towards 
immigrants. This is an important finding because it allows researchers to further our inquiry of 
why some individuals tend to support anti-immigrant policies. We know that economic 
competition leads to anti-immigrant policy support (Branton & Jones 2005), however, we know 
little about the economic competition that occurs in small towns. With the demographic changes 
occurring so quickly throughout the U.S. it becomes increasingly competitive to find jobs even in 
small towns. While one would think that job competition might be more difficult in cities 
because of the large population, it might actually be the case that the job market is just as 
difficult in small towns because of the limited number of jobs available.   
On average, rural residents are 10% more likely than urban residents to believe that they 
or a family member has lost a job or did not get a job because of an immigrant. This is quite a 
large number considering the context. Rural areas are much more likely to have lower paying 
jobs and fewer residents with college degrees. Therefore, in the context of a labor-force that is 
lower educated and lower paying, I suspect rural residents feel constant threat by immigrants not 
just because of their location, but because of the types of employment available.  
Economic competition, like anywhere else, is a huge threat to one’s livelihood, but 
perhaps more so in small towns. Rural towns do not have the political clout and sheer number of 
interest groups as large cities. What ends up occurring, in many cases, is that individuals of 
affluent backgrounds have an enormous amount of political power. For example, in one of the 
small towns my colleagues and I visited, we met a private sector attorney who was also a council 
member, the county attorney, and a school board member. He was able to do this because of the 
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lack of competition for these political positions and because of the economic resources allotted to 
him. In small towns, well-paying jobs do not necessarily mean college educated corporate-level 
jobs. In many instances, a good living can be made in home construction, food-processing plants, 
and agriculture. Because many jobs like this do not need much formal education, these are, of 
course, the types of jobs that immigrants will try to seek out as well. Therefore, it should not be 
taken lightly how important job competition is in rural America and why this might significantly 
influence attitudes towards immigrants.  
The race variables are also important to note in model 1. The model suggests that there is 
no statistically significant difference between whites and Hispanics who feel like they have lost a 
job to an immigrant. However, blacks seem to think that they or a family member has lost a job 
because of an immigrant. This is consistent with previous work examining attitudes towards 
immigrants when economic competition is occurring between blacks and Latinos (Gay 2006). 
The comparison variable between blacks and Latinos is a very strong predictor of threat. On 
average, blacks are 15% more likely to believe they lost a job to an immigrant than Hispanics, all 
else equal. We would expect this to be the case because Latinos might be more sympathetic to 
immigrants and might not think they lost a job because they might be an immigrant themselves. 
The competition that blacks face because of immigrants is obviously a threat to their well-being 
because of the similar occupations both labor-forces undertake. Because my findings are 
consistent with other scholarly work, I am confident in the results provided by the models. It is 
important to acknowledge the economic competition that occurs between minority groups. 
Blacks have historically been a strong workforce in labor-intensive work. Now, however, 
Latinos are starting to move into areas previously or still concentrated by blacks and becoming 
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an economic labor force. For example, much was made in the news about Latinos moving into 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina forced thousands of African Americans to relocate.  
Looking at the statistically significant socio-economic variables and their predicted 
probabilities, Age has the overall strongest impact when the variable changes from its minimum 
to its maximum. Yet, the effect is quite minimal when we look at a yearly progression. Still, the 
variable suggests that younger generations feel more threatened by immigrants in their job 
opportunities. Labor-intensive jobs are usually obtained by a younger workforce who can deal 
with the heat, exhaustion, and lower education needed to qualify for such jobs. Therefore, it 
should be no surprise that age is associated with feelings of job threat due to immigrants.  
Education, Income, and Employment Status are all individual economic indicators that 
are associated with the respondent believing that they may have lost a job because of an 
immigrant. Each is important because the variable can be interpreted two ways. For example, the 
education variable leads us to believe that as education increases respondents are less likely to 
believe they have lost a job to an immigrant. The interpretation of that variable is correct, but it 
can also be interpreted as, the lower the respondent’s education, the more likely they are to 
believe that an immigrant took their job. Likewise, respondents whose income is above $75,000 
per year are significantly less likely to believe they lost a job because of an immigrant. However, 
respondents whose income is below $75,000 per year are more likely to think they lost a job to 
an immigrant. I point these two variables out because they clearly illustrate competition between 
blue-collar workers and immigrants, but not white-collar workers and immigrants. The variables 
suggest that immigrants are not threatening college graduates and professionals, but individuals 
who have lower levels of education who depend on jobs like construction, food plants, and 
agriculture for their livelihood. These are the types of jobs that immigrants also compete for 
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because of the little formal education needed for these types of jobs. The income variable 
supports my assumption. Respondents of higher economic status do not feel like they are being 
threatened by immigrants because their livelihood is safe. However, individuals from lower 
economic status feel more threatened by immigrants because they tend to compete for the same 
types of jobs.  
Employment Status compliments the economic indicators as well. The model suggests 
that respondents who have a full-time job are less likely to believe they lost a job to an 
immigrant. Of course this also means that respondents who are not fully employed are more 
likely to believe they lost a job to an immigrant. I highlight this point because it is impossible to 
know for sure why a person did not get a job, but if an individual believes that they do not have a 
full-time job because of an immigrant then this is a personal threat on his/her livelihood. The 
perception of losing a job to an immigrant is like the perception of the respondent believing they 
have lots of immigrant contact. While the reality may not reflect that situation, the respondent’s 
beliefs may overtake reality and therefore influence their decision-making process.  
Threat on Quality of Life 
Looking at perception on whether individuals believe that their local government services 
has gotten better or worse due to immigrants is important. As I mentioned above, when the 
respondent hears this question it could trigger feelings towards a variety of local government 
services. Overall, however, it puts into the mind of the respondent that immigrants could make 
visits to the hospital more time-consuming and congested or that immigrants may have 
contributed to more efficient construction on busy streets. In Model 2, higher positive 
coefficients suggest respondents believe their local government services have gotten “worse” due 
to recent immigrants. The results indicate that, on average, rural residents are more likely than 
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urban residents to think that their local government services have gotten worse because of recent 
immigrants.  
Looking at the predicted probabilities, rural residents are about 10% more likely than 
urban residents to believe that their local government services have gotten worse since the arrival 
of recent immigrants, all else equal. This is a large impact on the dependent variable because we 
are only considering whether or not the respondent lives in a rural area or an urban area. There 
are many factors that could influence why an individual would blame immigrants on the 
worsening of their services. Many of which are socio-economic factors, which are controlled for 
in this analysis. But simply taking geographic location into consideration allows scholars to view 
rural and urban differences in ways we have not previously examined them. There is not a study 
on the rural and urban divide and perceptions of services at the local-level. Looking at who 
threatens the livelihood of individuals at the local-level is becoming increasingly important due 
to the changing demographics in rural towns across the U.S. By understanding why immigrants 
are a threat to rural residents, scholars can begin to look at ways in which individuals can 
overcome feelings of threat by recent immigrants.   
When we are looking at what threatens individuals it is important to look at multiple 
aspects of their lives. This question, I feel, takes into account many different aspects of the 
respondent’s life. By illustrating that rural residents-more than urban residents-feel like their 
services have gotten worse, it becomes clear that the threat caused by immigrants plays an 
intricate role in the respondents’ policy attitudes. Perhaps in urban areas, people expect traffic 
congestion and longer waiting time for meals, construction, and health care. This is not typically 
the case in rural areas where the population is so small that waiting times are usually minimal. 
Yet, as I argue, because changes in small towns are so visible, rural residents may feel like their 
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waiting times at a hospital or their tax money going into bilingual education has made their 
overall local services worse due to recent immigrants.  
Race is also associated with attitudes towards local government services due to recent 
immigrants. Whites and blacks are both more likely that Hispanics to believe that their local 
government services has gotten worse because of recent immigrants. On average, whites and 
African Americans are 19% and 12% more likely than Latinos to believe their services have 
gotten worse due to recent immigrants, respectively. Latinos seem to be more sympathetic to 
recent immigrants because perhaps they, a family member, or a friend is a recent immigrant and 
they believe that recent immigrants have made their community better. Remember, this question 
is unique in that it allows the respondent to think about what local government services are 
important to them. Perhaps Latinos feel like local government services have gotten better 
because of recent immigrants because they are able to find Spanish language assistance in 
government services. Since there is a new population of Spanish speakers, localities may have 
needed to hire bilingual education teachers, bilingual police officers, attorneys, and medical 
assistants. In this case, for Latinos, their services have gotten better due to recent immigrants 
because there are more social services workers that can address issues that are important to them.  
Negative attitudes by whites and blacks towards immigrants may be a function of placing 
the blame on Latinos for tough economic times. Historically, during bad economic times 
immigrants receive the bulk of the blame in state and local politics (Hutchison 1981; Cornelius 
1982). I believe this is occurring in rural towns throughout the United States. Rather than talk 
about the role of the government in bad economic times or placing the blame on policies, 
political elites tend to focus on how immigrants are making their community worse. This is 
illustrated by the names of some state and local policies that have passed across the country. In 
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2006, only a few months after this survey was taken, the city council of Hazelton, PA, passed the 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act. The name of the ordinance suggests that the town has been 
consumed by immigrants and thus is in need of relief. In 2007, in Manassas, VA, supporters of 
anti-immigrant ordinances began a grassroots movement called “Help Save Manassas”. This 
group was visible in the media, in city-council meetings, and through the internet where 
hundreds of anonymous posts fed the growing perception that immigrants were to blame for the 
worsening conditions. Perhaps the most notable state law passed, Arizona’s SB1070 was called 
the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act”. On paper who could disagree 
with not supporting law enforcement and wanting safe neighborhoods? This law with its basis in 
racial profiling targeted Latinos as the problem. The name of the law suggests that recent 
immigrants, and in Arizona with its proximity to Mexico means Latinos, are causing problems 
for the police. Moreover, they are threatening the well-being of your family’s neighborhood and 
thus their livelihood. Therefore, the race variable seems like a likely candidate to be related to 
attitudes on government services due to recent immigrants. Because much of the news media 
focuses negatively on Latinos and the names of laws and ordinances across the country builds 
the perception that Latinos are to blame for the deteriorating services.  
Age and marital status are two socio-economic factors that are also associated with 
thinking that recent immigrants make local government services worse. The Age probability 
from minimum to maximum illustrated an overall 27% change in the dependent variable. This 
demonstrates, on average, vast differences between respondents who are 18 and those who are 
97. Younger respondents may actually feel like recent immigrants have made their local services 
better because they have become friends with newer generations of Latinos.  Older generations, 
more than younger generations, seem to think that recent immigrants have made local 
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government services in their town worse. Older individuals perhaps think about only a decade or 
two ago when their community looked much different in terms of demographics. Because the 
Latino population is booming across the U.S. this may influence older generations to think that 
Latinos are the cause of local government services not being as efficient as “they used to be”.  
Married respondents are significantly more likely than single respondents to think that 
local services have gotten worse. I attribute this finding also to news media and the names of 
immigration laws across the country. For married couples many of whom have children, their 
family is the most important thing to him/her. If they feel their child is not getting the best 
education possible due to some tax money going to bilingual education, then this can be seen as a 
threat to the individual’s livelihood. Also, if hospital visits take longer because of the changing 
demographics in a town this could lead married couples to believe that their local government 
services have gotten worse due to recent immigrants.  
Finally, Republicans and Conservatives are also more likely to think that their local 
government services have gotten worse due to recent immigrants. This finding should not be 
surprising since anti-immigrant laws and ordinances that have sprouted up across the country 
have been led by Republicans and conservatives. They use the narrative that immigrants have 
become a drain on social services, education, and police. The state laws and local ordinances, 
and their names, are drafted with the intentions of placing blame on recent immigrants for the 
worsening conditions in their community. 
Each of the statistically significant variables in Model 2 demonstrates that respondents 
perceive recent immigrants make their local government services worse.  In bad economic times, 
as was the case in 2006 when this survey was taken, immigrants are typically used as a scapegoat 
by politicians and local elites. By using the media and internet to further these perceptions, elites 
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are able to place the blame on immigrants and thus pursue their political agenda, such as passing 
local immigrant ordinances. The negative coverage of Latinos in the media enhances the 
respondent’s perception that recent immigrants are a drain on the community.  
Threat of Crime 
The final model in Table 4 examine whether or not respondents believe immigrants from 
Latin American countries increase crime. This is the only dependent variable that specifically 
looks at immigrants from Spanish speaking countries so we are certain the respondent is thinking 
about Latinos. Further, because of the negative media coverage of Latinos, this question does a 
good job of examining perceptions of crime due to Latinos.  
Model 3 supports my hypothesis and shows that, on average, rural residents are more 
likely than urban residents to believe that Latin American immigrants increase crime. The 
comparison between rural and urban residents is statistically significant at the 0.10 level and a 
0.05 level on a one-tailed test. I mention this because all other rural variables on the other models 
are significant at a 0.05 level on a two-tailed test. Still, even on a two-tailed test and being 90% 
confident that my results are not by chance, the importance of the rural and urban divide for this 
variable is strong when you consider the predicted probabilities. When using logistic regression 
it is important to keep in mind the actual effects on the dependent  
On average, rural residents are 15% more likely than urban residents to characterize Latin 
American immigrants as criminals. This is quite shocking considering urban areas have more 
immigrants and more crime than rural areas. The fact that rural residents perceive Latinos as 
criminals is very important in understanding why rural populations are more likely to support 
local immigrant ordinances. Psychologically, they view Latinos as a threat to their family’s well-
being. This again illustrates the difference between the perception of the respondent and the 
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reality. Realistically speaking, we do not know whether or not Latinos have increased crime in 
the respondent’s city or town. Regardless of what has caused (or not caused) an increase in 
crime, the rural respondents are more likely to believe it is because of Latinos. When it comes to 
their decision-making process, for rural residents, supporting anti-immigrant ordinances leads 
them to believe that they are doing what is best for their community and their family. In this 
case, they are ridding themselves of threatening criminals.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrate why rural residents are more likely than urban residents to 
support anti-immigrant policies. While most studies focus on “who” supports anti-immigrant 
policies, little research examines the “why”. As my models illustrate, socio-economic, partisan, 
and ideological factors do play a role in attitudes towards immigrants, however, I believe that 
support for these anti-immigrant policies is rooted in psychological feelings towards immigrants.  
The models depicted in Tables 2-4 illustrate “why” rural residents are more likely to 
exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants. In their view, immigrants are to blame for the 
problems in their town. My argument comes down to the respondent’s view of reality versus 
perception. Realistically, we know that more immigrants live in urban areas. Yet, the perception 
remains among rural residents that there are “many” immigrants in their area. The perception by 
rural residents that there are “many” new immigrants in their area leads them to believe that any 
negative changes to their town must be the product of immigrants.  
The changes in their community are not sitting well with rural residents either.  Just by 
sheer numbers, we know that there are more limited English speakers in urban areas. Why then 
do rural residents feel like they come into contact more with limited English speakers than urban 
residents? And why are they more bothered by the contact? The dynamic of a small rural town 
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keeps rural residents insulated from people of different cultures and nationalities. Therefore, 
even when coming into contact with a limited English speaker once a week might seem 
negligible to an urban resident, to rural residents it feels like a lot because of their isolation from 
people that are unlike them. Further, they feel bothered by this contact because rural residents are 
supporters of the status quo. An urban resident may not feel as bothered by having contact with a 
limited English speaker because they know many live in urban areas so there is not much of an 
element of surprise. Contrast this to living in a rural area where immigrants and Spanish speakers 
are historically atypical and the feelings of anxiety and unease begin to increase.   
 When looking at threat and loss, can we determine with concrete evidence that an 
immigrant took a job from another worker? Whether immigrants are deteriorating the local 
quality of life? Or whether they are the single cause of increases in crime? The reality is we 
cannot determine any of these questions for their validity. Still, among rural residents the blame 
on jobs lost, worsening government services, and increases in crime falls solely on immigrants. 
Why is this? I argue that rural residents are more likely to perceive contact, threat, and loss due 
to immigrants because of the smaller fishbowl-like livelihood that occurs in a rural town.  
Urban residents may not perceive threat at the heights of rural residents because a many 
more factors can influence their situation. Urban areas each have their residential neighborhood 
so individuals living in an affluent part of town may not believe that an immigrant took their job 
because a college or professional degree is needed. Likewise, residents of a large city should 
already be expecting 5 o’clock traffic jams and restaurant waiting lines so they may not place the 
blame on immigrants as much as rural residents. Finally, population changes in urban areas are 
not felt to as great of a degree as they are in smaller communities. Because of the smaller 
geographic area, visible changes to a community are heightened. Since rural residents believe 
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there are “many” new immigrants in their community, they may place the blame on them for any 
increases in crime. Overall, the limited resources and expectations of living in a small town make 
the threat of immigrants amplify the contact, threat, and losses. 
Still, the question remains, how are these psychological feelings of threat and loss related 
to immigration policy attitudes? I have stated that these feelings are related to immigration policy 
preferences, but have not provided any evidence.  At this point it is still an assumption. In the 
next chapter I bring these two ideas together. I look solely at rural white residents using a face-
to-face survey conducted in four rural Midwestern towns. I illustrate that feelings of political and 
economic loss drive rural white support for local immigrant ordinances.  
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Chapter 3: Midwestern Case Study on Rural America 
Many studies that analyze immigration policy are now outdated, most of which examine 
attitudes towards federal immigration laws. The few that look at local immigration policy use 
data that was taken after the large majority of local ordinances passed. Out of the 47 rural 
localities that have passed immigrant ordinances all but one occurred within the last ten years 
and most in the latter half of the decade. I believe analyzing anxiety and threat with the 2006 
Pew Immigration Survey is great to use in this study. I feel like at that point in time, immigration 
hostilities and feelings of threat were at a boiling point. The demographic and visible changes in 
a given town were more apparent at the backend of the 2010s. Further, in 2007, the inaction of 
the federal government and President Bush’s attempt at immigration reform had stalled and 
policy changes at the federal level were dead.  It is soon thereafter that we began to see state and 
local governments take immigration into their own hands. This is why I use two nationally 
representative polls from 2010 to analyze actual policy changes. That being said, because the 
2010 CBS/NYT are weekly polls they only ask a few relevant questions of respondents each 
week and they only include measures of socio-economic status, partisanship, and ideology as 
controls. They do not compliment their survey with the broad breath of questions that the 2006 
Pew Immigration Survey does. Therefore, while I can make conclusions about why rural 
residents are more likely to support local immigrant ordinances, I cannot be confident in my 
assertions.  To overcome this problem I include a survey of rural residents taken in the summer 
of 2011.  
In February 2006, at the urging of my cousin, I moved to Dodge City, Kansas. He and his 
partner specialize in immigration, criminal, and worker’s compensation cases at their law firm. 
At the time I was thinking about attending law school myself and he offered to let me work 
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under his tutelage to see if it was something I would be interested in doing. While practicing law 
wasn’t exactly for me, living in Dodge City for those two years gave me insight into my future 
research.  
Living in Southwestern Kansas, I was able to see first-hand the demographic changes that 
had occurred in rural areas like this all across the country. Dodge City, for example, had become 
50% Hispanic due to the labor needs of meat packing plants. As a witness to these changes, I 
began to wonder how rural whites felt about the numerous Mexican restaurants, bars, and overall 
Mexican culture that had encompassed their small town. I assumed that rural whites knew that 
their town could not have had the economic success it did without immigrants and the labor force 
they provided. However, I wondered if rural white felt like their traditional way of life felt 
threatened because of the booming immigrant population. This life experience led me to begin to 
ponder research questions that I was able to further investigate in graduate school and eventually 
led to the 2011 Rural Community Survey.   
2011 Rural Community Survey 
The 2011 Rural Community Survey is the product of collaboration between me, Brian 
Hanson, and Thomas Ringenberg. The idea for the project came in our first year at the University 
of Kansas while we were taking a research design class. We were bumping ideas off each other 
and talking about our particular research interests. We were talking about survey data, our own 
experiences in small towns, and immigration reform. I had once lived in a small town in Kansas, 
Brian was originally from a rural town in Nebraska, and Thomas was from Southwestern 
Missouri. Each of us was aware of the changing demographics in the towns we were familiar 
with and we agreed that agriculture and meat-packing plants sprouting up across the Midwest 
had played an important role in these changes. As we were talking about these topics, it became 
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more apparent to us that if anyone ever wanted to use public opinion to study rural populations 
the data was usually poor. Nationally representative surveys like the one used in chapter 2 
typically only have around 100 rural respondents. We began to discuss ways we could develop 
our own rural survey and with the blessing of our professor the seeds for this project were 
planted.   
We submitted a proposal to the University Of Kansas Department Of Political Science’s 
Thompson Summer Grant. We argued that with the limited amount of rural public opinion, our 
project would benefit scholars of rural politics, Latino politics, and immigration politics. We also 
suggested that the study would benefit the University of Kansas because it would appear that the 
university has a vested interest in the rural populations of Southwestern Kansas.   
We had grandiose ideas of visiting eight rural communities around the Midwest, 
however, as many scholars can tell you, once the amount of grant money is allotted it does not go 
as far as you’d think. Therefore, we became very selective in the cities we wanted to visit. We 
settled on four communities, two in Kansas and two in Nebraska. The communities we visited 
from June 2011-July 2011 are Garden City and Dodge City, Kansas and Grand Island and 
Fremont, Nebraska. We picked these four localities for a number of reasons.  
 
First, they fit into our definition of “rural”. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, these four 
towns fit our definition: Garden City (26,658), Dodge City (27,340), Grand Island (48,520), and 
Table 5. Rural Community Survey Towns 
 2000 
Population 
2010 
Population 
2000 Latino 
Population 
2010 Latino 
Population 
Latino Pop. 
Change 
Dodge City, 
KS 
25,176 27,340 42.9% 57.5% +14.6% 
Garden City, 
KS 
28,451 26,658 43.9% 48.5% +4.6% 
Grand Island, 
NE 
42,940 48,520 15.9% 26.7% +10.8% 
Fremont, NE 25,174 26,397 4.3% 11.9% +7.6% 
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Freemont (26,397). Second, the size and growth of the Latino population is very diverse. The 
Latino population growth ranged from 4.6% in Garden City, KS to 14.6% in Dodge City, KS.  
Third, each was driving distance from the University of Kansas. We were on the road for 4 
weeks and we needed to come back to Lawrence to restock on supplies. Finally, it was cost 
efficient for us. We knew friends and family in Dodge City, Garden City, and Fremont, NE so 
we only needed to pay for a hotel in Grand Island.  
Looking at the towns individually, each came with its own focal point that intrigued us. 
Dodge City, KS a western town made famous by Wyatt Earp, cowboys, and outlaws in the 1800s 
is now majority Latino. The Latino population has brought this small western town back to life. 
They have weekly gun fight shows on their main street, Wyatt Earp Blvd. And they recently 
opened up a casino to try to attract more tourism into their community. Destinations like Dodge 
City are atypical immigrant destinations. The Latino population is diverse in Dodge City as well. 
During our field work, we met immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, and even some non-Latino immigrants from 
Haiti and Somalia. In conversing with some of the immigrants we met in Dodge City, it became 
clear that they came because of the jobs available in their town. The overall size of the Latino 
population in this town illustrates the growth and demographic change in the town due to meat-
packing plants.  
Garden City, Kansas is unique in its own ways as well. This town had the lowest percent 
change in the Latino population over the last ten years. However, this town has been home to 
many different types of immigrants since the 1800s because of the railroad expansion to the 
west.  
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After the first settlers arrived Garden City in 1878, a post office was quickly established 
in the town. The town’s cofounders James and William Fulton soon took the lead in pressuring 
the Santa Fe Railroad to build a station in Garden City. In May 1879, the railroad station’s first 
telegraph was sent indicating, “Office O.K. at Garden City” (Blanchard 1931). Once the railroad 
station was fully operational, the city’s first immigrants were white settlers who displaced 
American Indians in the region. Also, many Mexican families in Garden City can trace their 
roots to this time. The addition of the railroad brought new and expanding economic 
opportunities. Many Mexican immigrants found work in a sugar beet plant in Garden City and 
many more came looking for other types of agricultural work (Klepper 2010). The addition of 
the railroad paved the way for some of Kansas’ first Mexican immigrants to settle in this town 
and, therefore, its unique history adds to this study.  
The smallest town in our survey is Fremont, Nebraska. As we talked about potential 
towns to visit, this town was always very important to us. We wanted to look at Fremont because 
of the relatively small size of the Latino population. Unlike the other three cities in our sample, 
Fremont’s Latino population falls below the 16.3% national average (Passel et. al. 2011).  
Fremont is interesting because its population change got it close to the national average in a short 
amount of time. The town’s Latino population grew from 4.3% to 11.9% in 10 years. Perhaps 
most important to this study is that Fremont, Nebraska is the only town we were able to visit that 
had passed an anti-immigrant ordinance. This is the “Small Nebraska town” that was addressed 
in the local housing ordinance in Chapter 2 (Table 1). With 57% of the vote, on June 21, 2010 
the citizens of Fremont, Nebraska passed ordinance No. 5165 by ballot initiative. On the ballot 
initiative given to voters, the following was written:  
WHEREAS, The presence of illegal aliens places a fiscal burden on the City, increasing the 
demand for, and cost of, public benefits and services, and;.  
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WHEREAS, Crimes committed by illegal aliens in the City harm the health, safety and welfare 
of U.S. citizens and aliens lawfully present in the United States, and;  
WHEREAS, The employment of unauthorized aliens in the City displaces authorized United 
States workers and adversely affects their wages. 
 
This ordinance “prohibit[ed] the harboring of illegal aliens or hiring of unauthorized aliens”. Since 
this ordinance has passed it has been stopped by federal court-order.  
The federal government, through the Department of Justice, sued this small town and 
argued that immigration is a federal issue and this town surpassed their legal jurisdiction. Many 
critics and political leaders hoped the issue would die in federal court. However, on July 2, 2013, 
nearly two years after its original passage, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the law to 
this dismay of business & political leaders and immigrant rights advocates. What subsequently 
followed this ruling is truly remarkable. The economic losses due to the immigrants leaving, and 
thus leaving a meat-packing plant undermanned, was quickly felt business & political leaders in 
the town.  Political leaders claimed the law made Fremont looked racist and business leaders 
pressured lawmakers to take another vote on the law. Therefore, on February 11, 2014 a revote 
was taken on Ordinance 5165, this time it passed with 60% of the vote, an increase from the 
previous ballot initiative. This best illustrates the dilemma facing rural whites: like any other 
town or city, they welcome economic expansion and opportunities, but at what cost? For rural 
whites in Fremont, the cost of having a perceived significant immigrant population in their town 
supersedes the economic opportunities that they may provide.   
 Grand Island, Nebraska is by far the biggest town in our analysis. Grand Island received 
its name from French traders who called it La Grande Isle because it was looked like an island 
due to the crossing Wood and Platt Rivers. In 1865, Union Pacific Railroad built a station just off 
the island and called it Grand Island Station. The railroad station brought growth to a community 
that was known for hotels and merchants. It was a destination for gold prospectors and sellers 
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since it was on the way to Pike’s Peak Colorado, an area booming due to the rare mineral. 
During the late 1880s, Grand Island saw its agricultural & mechanical infrastructure greatly 
increase. The building and expansion of cigar factories, flour mills, sugar beet processing 
factories, and other domestic products sprang from Grand Island at this time (Grand-Island.com 
2014).   
More recently, Grand Island has seen its Latino population grow since the 1980s. The 
expansion of the sugar beet industry, along with a large scale meat-packing plant owned by Swift 
& Co. contributed to the Latino growth. This town differs from the others in its history with the 
federal government and dealing with immigrants. On December 12, 2006 a concerted effort by 
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency called “Operation Wagon Trail” raided 
six meat-packing plants in six different states, Swift & Co.’s Grand Island plant was one of these 
plants. The raid was part of an ongoing investigation of social security fraud; all in all, over 250 
undocumented immigrants were bused to Iowa by ICE officials to await their deportation 
hearings. Seven years later, Yolanda Nuncio still describes the incident as if it was yesterday, ““I 
don’t think you’ll ever get over that feeling in this community that day because you could see the 
helicopters, you were hearing stories, you saw the law enforcement, and by then people know 
what was going on and people were fearful” (Brocious 2013). The immediate impacts were 
heavily felt by the Grand Island community as a whole as well, Nuncio states, “Businesses were 
suffering because they had no one coming in to buy things. People were afraid. And then the 
rumors were flying around—the migra’s here, they’re coming, they’re going to go to your 
houses and the restaurants. So people stayed home, where they felt they were a little safer” 
(ibid). Perhaps most difficult for the community as a whole was to address children of those take 
of why their mother or father had been taken. It is important to note that local officials were 
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asked by ICE to assist and participate in the raids; Grand Island Police Chief Steve Lamken 
refused to cooperate. This is a clear distinction between some rural towns who want their local 
law enforcement to act as immigration officials and other rural towns who do not.  
We visited each of the towns dressed with professional University of Kansas polo shirts. 
We wanted people to take our survey seriously and if we happened to randomly select an 
undocumented immigrant we wanted to make it clear that we were not working for a government 
agency nor would we provide any sensitive information to such agencies. We made these 
stipulations clear during our institutional review board (IRB) application. We spent between 3-5 
days in each community and we solicited volunteers to participate in our survey in a variety of 
ways. Upon arriving into a town we would go to their public records book keeper and ask for a 
voting precinct map. With this map we would randomly pick out a neighborhood that we would 
spend the next few hours canvassing. When we arrived at the neighborhood each of us was 
assigned a street or two and we decided to knock on every third door.   
We also visited each town’s community college. Before we visited a town we would 
email community college professors and instructors and tell them that we were graduate student 
researchers from KU and tell them about our project. We would ask if they would be willing for 
us to ask their classes if they would like to fill out our survey. We ended up surveying 10 
different community college classes total. Those who did not let us speak to their class insisted 
that their class would not be interested in the survey because of the subject matter of the course, 
the lack of time allotted to them over the summer term, or they simply did not return our emails. 
Finally, we visited local businesses, non-profits, and public offices and asked if we could leave a 
few our survey pamphlets in their office. We did not want to bother them during business hours 
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so we would drop them off and pick-up-any completed surveys the next day. Combined, these 
three survey methods yielded a total of 341 respondents.  
When we asked volunteers if they wanted to participate in the survey, we made sure to 
tell them how it important it was for their town. We explained that most nationally representative 
surveys take very small samples of rural populations and that this survey was an avenue to give 
people like them a voice. Many of them appreciated our effort and told us that it was about time 
someone wanted to know what they thought because they felt like their politicians at the state 
capital and Washington, D.C. did not care about them.   
We were not without our problems during this project. As you can imagine, racial 
tensions over immigration is a very passionate issue for many people. In one example, while we 
were in one of the towns we had dropped off several surveys on the same street hoping to pick 
them up completed the next day. When we went by the next day, the first house told us they had 
changed their minds and were not interested in our project. We knocked on the second house and 
the person told us that he did not like our survey and subsequently ripped it apart in front of us. 
Finally, on the third house on the same street, the resident told us flat out “I hate Mexicans and I 
don’t want to do your survey”. In Fremont, NE many of the town’s residents were not interested 
in our survey because they were angry that the federal government had halted their immigration 
ordinance. They simply wanted the Obama administration to drop their lawsuit to allow their city 
government to enforce their laws. The residents did not like all of the negative national attention 
the ordinance had brought to their town. In their minds, they just wanted their laws to be 
enforced. Their ordinance and national coverage of the town was still fresh in the minds of its 
residents when we visited, it just so happened we were in Fremont during the one-year 
anniversary of the passage of the ordinance.  
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Data & Methods 
  The survey itself was comprised of 73 multi-part questions for Latinos and 53 questions for 
non-Latinos. There are more questions for Latinos because I wanted to examine political behavior of 
rural Latinos in future research. The survey was administered face-to-face, in a classroom setting, or 
for available for later pick-up. The respondent was able to choose their language preference, English 
or Spanish. Our survey utilizes questions used on previous national surveys, such as the General 
Social Survey, the American National Election Studies surveys, the Harris Poll, Gallup, and the 2006 
Latino National Survey. The use of these questions provides us with increased confidence in the 
validity of our results, as the questions have been previously tested numerous times.  
 With this survey, I am able to expand on the analysis from chapter 2 and bring my 
previous hypotheses together. I suggest that, 
H6: Rural residents who exhibit higher degrees of threat from Hispanic immigrants are 
more likely to support local anti-immigrant policies. 
 
This hypothesis stems from the findings in chapter 2. Rural residents are more likely than urban 
residents to illustrate feelings of threat and anxiety about Latinos and immigrants. Therefore, I 
suggest that, for rural residents, when these psychological feelings of threat are present then they 
are going to be more likely to support anti-Latino policies.  
Dependent Variables 
I measure this hypothesis with two questions that analyze attitudes towards a local city 
ordinance and another that measures a broader spectrum of anti-minority policy. The first 
question is my survey asks,  
“Should an English only law be passed and enforced in your town? Yes or No” 
 
I include this question because my previous research on rural immigrant ordinances 
demonstrated that English-only laws were the most frequently passed. When English-only laws 
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are passed, the wording is usually vague in what it actually sets out to accomplish. Typically, it 
means that all official government business must be conducted in English, English-only ballots, 
or workplace etiquette.  English-only policies are a way to demean the Spanish language. It 
infers that Spanish is a secondary language and is not welcome in a given city or state. For 
Latino children, when they feel like their culture and heritage is under attack, such as through the 
use of English-only policies, they exhibit lower self-esteem and their grades suffer (Padilla et. al. 
1991). Padilla et. al. (1991) suggest that the secondary status placed on Spanish due to English-
only laws appeal to nativist sentiments and are inherently racist. Therefore, looking at whether or 
not the respondent believes there should be an English-only law passed in their town 
demonstrates how rural residents try to use this ordinance as a way to deter further immigration. 
I test this variable using a logistic regression model where all respondents who stated that there 
should be an English-only law in there town are coded as 1 and those who disagreed are coded as 
0.  
Next, I use a broader measure of attitudes towards local ordinances as my second 
dependent variable. In this question, I look specifically at racial profiling and, the question states, 
“Some people say that law enforcement should be able to stop or detain people of certain 
racial backgrounds if these groups are thought to be more likely to commit crimes. This 
is called racial profiling. Others think racial profiling should not be done because it 
harasses many innocent people on account of their race. Which of these opinions do you 
agree with most? Allow Racial Profiling or Oppose Racial Profiling?” 
 
I use this question for a couple of important reasons. Racial profiling is certainly more of a broad 
policy question that affects many different minorities not just Latinos. However, in each of the 
four towns we visited, the total black population was between 2.8% in Garden City and 0.07% in 
Fremont, NE. Further, Table 5 illustrates Latinos are by far the dominate minority group in each 
community. Second, this questions whether respondents who perceive people they believe to 
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commit more crimes should be subject to racial profiling. I previously illustrated that rural 
residents are more likely than urban residents to believe that Latin American immigrants commit 
more crimes. Hence, this policy question directly taps into those fears. Finally, Arizona’s SB107 
law largely hinged on whether or not local law enforcement should have the power to stop and 
detain anyone they deemed suspicious. This policy question addresses this issue as well. Racial 
profiling is a policy that is enforced at the local-level because it is local law enforcement that is 
given the power to enact this law. Thus, using this question should illicit responses from rural 
residents who are thinking of Latinos because of their size in the community and whether they 
believe local law enforcement should have the power to stop suspicious looking Latinos. I also 
use a logistic regression model to analyze this variable. I code all respondents who answered that 
racial profiling would be allowed as 1 and all those who opposed the policy as 0.  
Independent Variables 
My primary independent variable is Hispanic Threat.  This variable is an additive 
variable that is comprised of two questions that measures the perception of the respondent’s 
losses due to Hispanics. As I mentioned in chapter 2, the perception of threat by rural residents is 
going to lead them to be more hostile to Latinos. If rural whites feel like their livelihood is being 
taken from them because of Hispanics then they are going to be more likely to support policies 
that punish Latinos. I use two questions that measure the feelings of economic and political loss. 
The first question taping ‘political loss’ asks: 
“The more influence that Hispanics have in politics the less influence people like me will 
have in politics. Strongly Disagree (0), Somewhat Disagree (1), Somewhat Agree (2), or 
Strongly Agree (3)”  
 
If rural residents perceive that they are losing political power to Hispanics then this might 
shape their policy decision making on local ordinances. The few resources available to rural 
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communities heighten the importance for political power in areas of influence such as: county 
boards, city councils, and school boards. The ability to control power in these areas of politics 
allow individuals to designate where the city should allocate funds to improve roads, decide 
which types of businesses should get local tax breaks, and how much money schools should 
allocate for bilingual education.  In rural towns, where there is a much lower concentration of 
outside interest groups influencing politics, the citizens in power are very important.  
The second question addresses the perceived economic losses due to Hispanics. It states: 
“More good jobs for Hispanics mean fewer good jobs for people like me. Strongly 
Disagree (0), Somewhat Disagree (1), Somewhat Agree (2), or Strongly Agree (3)”  
 
The common argument used by opponents of immigration reform is that it will flood the market 
with a new labor force and therefore hurt job prospects for Americans. Immigration reform has 
not yet passed, however-some rural residents may still perceive that Hispanics will increase 
competition for good jobs and therefore hurt their own job opportunities. The threat of losing out 
on good paying jobs due to immigrants is a direct attack on their pocketbook and their family’s 
livelihood.  
It is important to remember that both of these questions hinge on the respondent’s 
perception of what will happen because of Hispanics. Realistically, neither we nor the 
respondent absolutely knows whether or not he/she will lose political and economic power 
because of Hispanics. The respondent may have other issues that hinder them from achieving 
their economic or political goals like lower education, drug use or criminal backgrounds, or work 
ethic. Yet, they may not take those issues into consideration because they are able to place the 
blame on Hispanics for their current situation. It is much like how political elites have 
historically blamed immigrants for economic downtowns, but at the individual-level. The total 
score of the respondent’s answers to these questions is added up and quantified as “Hispanic 
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Threat”. This variable runs from 0-6 where the least threatened respondents are equal to 0 and 
the most threatened rural residents are equal to 6. For instance, if the respondent answered that 
they strongly disagreed with both statements, that they do not feel at all like Hispanics are taking 
political and economic opportunities away from them, then their total score is a zero because of 
the two zero scores in parenthesis in the question above. If a respondent strongly agrees on both 
questions that Hispanics are taking their economic and political power then that respondent is 
given a total score of 6. Having an additive variable like this allows me to access how policy 
support changes as Hispanic threat changes at varying degrees.  
For likeness with Chapter 2, I include all the same control variables found in Tables 2-4. 
Gender, socio-economic status, partisanship, and ideology are all included in the analysis. The 
few changes should be noted. In the national opinion dataset, income is as a dichotomous 
variable with $75,000 per year as the cut off. In this analysis, the income variable is again 
dichotomous but the cut off is $55,000. I do this because the highest income marker in our 
survey was over $65,000 and I wanted to get a fair amount of respondents in each group as a cut 
off. Also, rural areas are typically poorer so making over 55,000 dollars a year is very much on 
the higher end of the income scale.  
The main change between this study and the national study is that I am only including 
whites in this analysis. I do this because the object of this study is to illustrate what types of rural 
residents are more likely to support anti-immigrant policies. The national datasets illustrate that 
Latinos are not anxious or threatened by other immigrants or Latinos, therefore there is no need 
to include them in this study as a comparison group. As for blacks, there were so few in the 
communities (average of 1.87% of the population) that we only surveyed 9 blacks or 2.64% of 
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our sample. Therefore, including blacks would not add to this analysis. Including only whites in 
this analysis yielded a total of 213 respondents.  
Findings 
 In Table 6 you will see 4 columns. The first column on the far left (1) represents the 
coefficients for the logistic regression model that examines support for a local English-only 
ordinance in the respondent’s town. The column to the right (1a) demonstrates the probability 
change in the dependent variable for the statistically significant variables in column 1. Column 2 
illustrates the coefficients for the logistic model that analyzes rural white support for racial 
profiling. The final column demonstrates the change in probability in support for racial profiling 
as the statistically significant variables in column 2 move from their minimum value to their 
maximum value. The coefficients are followed by their standard errors beneath them.  
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Model 1 examines the variables associated with support for an English-only law in the 
respondent’s community. The amount of threat felt by the rural white respondent in this survey is 
strongly related to support for an English-only ordinance. The model’s findings are statistically 
significant at below the 0.001 level. This means there is less than a 1/1000th percent chance that 
these results are occurring by accident.   
The results suggest that as the amount of threat felt by the respondent increases, their 
support for local English-only laws also increases. Conversely, respondents who feel little or no 
Table 6. Rural White Support for Local Anti-Immigrant Policies 
  (1)  
Support Local 
English-only 
Ordinance 
(1a) 
Probability 
 Change 
MinMax 
(2) 
Support for 
Racial Profiling 
(1a) 
Probability 
 Change 
MinMax 
Perceived 
Hispanic 
0.542*** 
(0.103) 
.66 0.469*** 
(0.125) 
.41 
Threat     
     
Female -0.213  -0.126  
 (0.363)  (0.419)  
     
Age 0.0313** .48 0.0103  
 (0.0111)  (0.0132)  
     
Education -0.146  0.185  
 (0.156)  (0.204)  
     
Income -0.463  0.165  
 (0.481)  (0.536)  
     
Marital 0.357  0.960* .10 
Status (0.395)  (0.482)  
     
Employed 0.342  -0.936* -.11 
 (0.403)  (0.467)  
     
Republican 1.012** .22 1.213* .14 
 (0.391)  (0.477)  
     
Conservative -0.272  0.506  
 (0.391)  (0.448)  
     
_cons -2.976**  -4.911***  
 (1.019)  (1.353)  
N 213  213  
adj. R2 .2272  .2198  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: 2011 Rural Community Survey 
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threat by Hispanics are less likely to support local English-only laws. The strength of the results 
is illustrated in the predicted probabilities. When the Hispanic Threat variable changes from its 
minimum of 0, those who feel no threat, to its maximum of 6, those who feel the most threat, 
there is a 66% change in the probability of supporting local English-only laws. Figure 1 
illustrates the difference in support for local English laws as threat increases. 
Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities for English-only Ordinance 
 
The blue dots connected by the blue line signify the average probability for a respondent 
with that degree of threat listed on the X-axis. The two red dashed lines represent the 95% 
confidence intervals as threat increases. The figure demonstrates how each additional degree of 
threat increases the likelihood of a rural white support for a local English-only law. Respondents 
who feel no economic or political threat due to Hispanics are, on average, about 12% more likely 
to support an English-only law. This finding suggests that respondents who are not threatened by 
Hispanics see no need to institute an ordinance that discriminates against the Spanish language 
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and culture. There is a stark difference between unthreatened respondents and the most 
threatened respondents. In this analysis, on average, those who feel most economically and 
politically threatened by Hispanics have nearly an 80% likelihood of supporting an English-only 
law in their town. This is where the change in predicated probability stems, the movement from 
its minimum to its maximum. This finding suggests that respondents who feel most threatened 
by Hispanics feel they need to do something about the “immigrant problem”.  
In their perception, Hispanics are a hindrance on their economic and political goals. By 
supporting local policies like English-only laws they hope that the environment will be hostile 
enough to persuade Hispanics in their town to leave and dissuade further immigration. This 
belief is essentially the mindset behind Arizona’s SB1070 law. The belief is that if you make the 
immigrant’s living situation so bad they will leave your community or not come at all. In effect, 
support for a local ordinance like English-only does this because it downgrades one’s identity 
and culture. It makes Latinos feel like second-class citizens. My hypothesis is strongly supported 
with the findings in Table 6, where threatened rural whites are significantly more likely to 
support anti-immigrant policies. 
The data in Model 2 suggest that an increase in threat due to Hispanics and felt by rural 
whites is significantly related to support for racial profiling. Likewise, respondents with little or 
no threat are less likely to support racial profiling. Like the threat variable in Model 1, these 
results are also statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The very small chance that these results 
are by accident gives me high confidence that threats of loss due to Hispanics plays an intricate 
role in immigrant policy support. I argue that in small towns, like the four included in this 
survey, racial profiling is a policy that disproportionately affects Latinos. The black population 
in rural towns is negligible and the Latino population is present and growing. Further, the data 
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shows that supporters of the English-only laws and supporters of racial profiling are correlated. 
Therefore, I am confident that when rural white respondents are answering this question and 
thinking about “groups [who] are thought to be more likely to commit crimes”, they are thinking 
about Hispanics.  
The change in probability from those least threatened to those most threatened is also 
large. On average, there is a 41% difference in supporting racial profiling between the 
respondents who are least threatened and respondents who are most threatened. Figure 2 below 
illustrates how varying degrees of threat influence support for racial profiling.  
Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities for Racial Profiling Support 
 
Looking at someone with a threat degree of 0 on the X-axis, we can see that on average, there is 
less than a 10% probability of that type of respondent supporting racial profiling.  The figure 
suggests that someone with 0 threats does not perceive Hispanics as a threat to their economic or 
political power and therefore would not agree with racial groups being harassed by local law 
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enforcement. Conversely, someone with a perceived threat-level of 6 views Latinos in their 
community as a group more likely to commit crimes and therefore are more willing to let local 
police question and detain members of these groups. This illustrates the power that Arizona’s 
state politicians were willing to give to local law enforcement. Local law enforcement in 
Arizona, for example, were making the lives of Latinos hard by being able to question and detain 
anyone they deemed to be suspicious. This led to many Latinos fleeing the state and persuaded 
others not go there. This is the impact of racial profiling in communities with a significant Latino 
population. That is why rural whites who are most threatened are the most likely to support racial 
profiling.  
The control variables in both models are in the expected direction and some are 
statistically significant and noteworthy. In Model 1, age and partisanship are both related to 
support for English-only laws. Older respondents are more likely than younger respondents to 
support English-only laws in their town.  This might occur because younger respondents may 
have grown up in school with Latinos and be more sympathetic to Spanish speakers. Older rural 
whites may be more likely to defend the status quo and less likely to appreciate the changes 
occurring in their community, perhaps they feel a local English-only law would reverse the 
changing demographics.  
The models both suggest that identifying as a republican is related to support for a local 
immigrant ordinances. Most studies on attitudes towards immigrant policies suggest that 
republicans are more likely to support policies that limit immigration. Further, most English-only 
laws that have passed at the state-level have passed with overwhelming republican majorities. 
One of the foremost advocates of a national English-only law is Former Senator Samuel Ichiye 
Hayakawa, a Republican from California. He has been promoting English as the official 
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language of the United States since 1984. Because of historical republican support of English-
only laws this finding is not a surprise. The predicted probabilities suggest that republicans, on 
average, are 22% more likely than democrats or independents to support a local English-only 
law. The effect of this variable on the dependent variable is very strong. While holding all other 
variables at their means, partisanship still determines approximately 1/5th of the decision making 
process on support for local English-only laws. Also, at the state-level, Republican support of 
laws like racial profiling is evident in laws like Arizona’s SB1070. It was passed by a strong 
republican majority in order to dissuade further immigration to Arizona. Republicans in this 
sample may believe it would have the same effect at the local-level and therefore keep unwanted 
Latinos from their community.  
Model 2 also includes statistically significant controls that inform us a great deal about 
the types of rural white residents that would support a racial profiling law. The model suggests 
that married residents are more likely than singles to support racial profiling. This is in the 
expected direction. Illustrated earlier, national public opinion suggests that married respondents 
are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants. The threat to their family is no 
doubt an influencing factor in their decision making process. Since rural residents believe 
Latinos increase crime, their decision to support racial profiling stems from trying to keep their 
family safe. They believe a racial profiling law would decrease crime because it would target 
Latinos and therefore keep their family safe. Again, much of their reasoning is based on 
perception and not subject to evidence of reality.  
Employment is also related to racial profiling. This variable, however, is statistically 
significant and negative. This means that respondents who have a full-time job are less likely 
than unemployed respondents to support racial profiling. I would attribute this to the competition 
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for jobs felt by the unemployed. They may feel like a racial profiling law would alleviate some 
of the competition for jobs between Latinos and themselves. The perception is that a law like this 
would incarcerate, remove, or dissuade further Latinos from coming into their town and flooding 
the labor market. On average, full-employment residents are 11% less likely than unemployed 
residents to support a racial profiling law. They already have gainful employment and therefore 
may not feel that a law like this would affect them very much.  
Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, I show that rural residents are more likely to have negative perceptions of 
immigrant, in particular, those of Latin American descent. The perception that Latin American 
immigrants take jobs, worsen quality of life, and increase crime leads rural whites to believe 
their livelihood is at risk. The findings illustrated in this chapter depict how threatened rural 
whites would likely react if local policies were taken for a vote in their town. For the exception 
of Fremont, NE, no other town in this sample had passed an immigrant ordinance. Still, in 
addition analysis, when I included a dichotomous variable to control for differences between 
towns, this factor had no significant effects. This means that in Fremont, there was enough 
perceived threat by rural residents to call on political leaders to allow them to take a vote on a the 
ballot initiative. Thus far, in Dodge City, Garden City, and Grand Island there has not been as 
much threat felt throughout the city. This does not mean there has not been any threat, quite the 
contrary. Because there were no differences between the towns, this means that if given the 
opportunity threatened rural whites in Dodge City, Garden City, and Grand Island would vote 
like rural threatened whites in Fremont.  
For rural whites who perceive threat from Hispanics, supporting policies like English-
only and racial profiling is a way that they can remove the psychological threat they are being 
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exposed to. English-only laws, because they seek to demean Spanish speakers by making them 
feel like second-class citizens, sends a message that unfamiliar languages and those who speak 
them are unwanted.  
Further, because rural residents perceive Latin American immigrants to increase crime, in 
their view, if there was a law that targets groups more likely to commit crimes, witch to them 
means Latinos, crime would go down. There is no evidence of this to be true; however, this was 
what the respondent perceives to be true. In a small town, like most cities, there is a heightened 
attention towards drug busts, but little attention paid to the many driving while under the 
influence (DUI) cases in every town. The constant media images of Mexican or Latino drug 
traffickers and drug cartel violence are seeped into the minds of Americans, especially in rural 
America. 
This chapter aimed to illustrate the degree to which Hispanic threat influenced local 
immigrant policy decision-making. Overall, the relationship between Hispanic threat and anti-
immigrant policy support is very strong. At the individual-level, rural whites who feel they are 
threatened by Hispanics, in politics and economics, are more likely to favor restrictive immigrant 
ordinances in their town. These findings help scholars understand why rural residents favor more 
restrictive immigration policies. Moreover, the small towns across the country that have decided 
to pass their own immigrant policies give us an idea of how some citizens are dealing with “the 
immigrant problem”.  
If there are threatened rural whites across the Midwest and the country as I argue, what is 
it about towns like Fremont, NE that makes them more likely than Dodge City, Garden City, or 
Grand Island to pursue and pass a local immigrant ordinance? Until this study, partisanship has 
been the focal point of these towns, but as I have shown, it is much more about feelings of loss 
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and a competition for the limited resources available in small towns. Adding to the overall piece 
of the puzzle, I next examine the types of rural towns that are more likely to pass anti-immigrant 
ordinances. After all, not all rural towns are alike or else we would see many more local 
immigrant ordinances than we currently have. I address the differences between rural towns with 
and without local ordinances in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Rural City-Level Policy Analysis 
 The perceived Hispanic threat in some communities has ignited a firestorm of questions 
about public policy and what role local, state, and the federal government should play in 
immigration. Because of the inaction of the federal government on legislation regarding 
immigration, small towns, counties, and states have decided to pass immigration laws they feel 
would diminish their “immigration problem”. The types of laws and ordinances vary greatly at 
the state and local level.  
In Arizona, for example, the state passed SB1070 which, among other things, allowed 
state and local police officers to check the immigration status of anyone who looked to be illegal 
(Lacayo, 2011). While the state has argued that it would not racially profile individuals, it is 
unlikely that local officers would be able to determine who is documented and undocumented by 
simply looking at an individual. There is no doubt that skin color and accents would play a role 
in dictating who might be questioned by Arizona law enforcement. This is a prime example of 
why some Hispanics feel these policies are aimed at all people of color rather than only 
immigrants.  
At the local level, in 2006 the Hazelton, PA city council passed the “Illegal Immigration 
Relief Act”. This ordinance sought to punish local landlords who knowingly rented to 
undocumented immigrants and also fined employers who would hire undocumented immigrants. 
By taking away an immigrant’s livelihood and access to a place of residence, towns like 
Hazelton, PA hoped that undocumented immigrants would leave their community, and that the 
policy would also stop future immigration.  
I examine small towns because I am interested in what makes them different from larger 
urban areas with greater populations of immigrants. Previous studies have analyzed why some 
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cities decide to pass anti-immigrant ordinances by including all cities regardless of population 
size (Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010). They argue and find that Latino population change and the 
percent of the population that identifies as Republican significantly increase the chances of 
immigration policy adoption. While I agree with their findings, I believe their study can be 
improved upon by looking solely at rural towns, which seem to be driving their analysis, and 
using contemporary data. There are obviously stark differences between urban and rural towns 
which I have illustrated in earlier chapters. 
Using contemporary data and examining only rural towns gives scholars a greater depth 
of knowledge about the types of rural towns that might be more likely to pass an immigrant 
ordinance.  Why are some small rural towns more likely to pass anti-immigrant ordinances while 
other rural small towns are not? Analyzing immigrant ordinances through this unique prism 
engages scholars to try and assess which towns might be more likely to pass immigrant laws in 
the future and allows for future research to examine how business elites and politicians play a 
role in influencing public opinion on immigration.  
Literature 
It is important to examine the types of rural towns that are more likely to pass local anti-
immigrant ordinances because it allows scholars to make generalizations, assumptions, and 
question how rural towns, that are atypical immigrant destinations, are dealing with their 
significant Latino growth. Many of the local immigration ordinances in these towns have been 
stopped by federal injunction and subsequent court rulings. However, it is important to know the 
characteristics of towns that would be more likely to react harshly to immigrants and why.  
While competition for resources occurs at all levels of politics, we should expect it to be 
maximized at the local-level, in particular in small locales. As the geography or context expands, 
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we can assume that the number of jobs, places to live, and over-all livelihood to be greater as 
well. This is why historically we see migration from rural areas to urban areas, because of the 
expanded opportunities and greater number of resources available in larger locales. Hopkins 
argues, “the effect [of threat] should be a function of local population shares and vary over time 
only to the extent that population shares do” (2010 p. 41). In other words, the competition 
between groups will vary as population changes between in-groups and out-groups increase and 
decrease. This should be more evident in smaller locations where a population changes more 
dramatically. 
In light of Hopkins’ statement, I argue that testing the influence of threat, such as passage 
of local immigration policy preferences, is best achieved at smaller geographic locales, which 
has yet to be studied. Threat theory is typically tested in urban areas or using in nation-wide polls 
(Taylor, 1998; Branton & Jones, 2005; Ha, 2010). These studies of course give us great 
information about who feels threatened and why, however, as I have shown already, rural and 
urban towns are very different in their feelings of threat because of Latinos.  
The dynamic of urban and rural towns are different. Because of present-day residential 
segregation (Lipset 1998), large cities typically include their own unique ethnic and racial 
neighborhoods in their city councils (Lyons & Jewell 1988). These neighborhoods provide a 
livelihood for the groups living in these areas. They may provide housing, jobs, places of 
entertainment, and schools. As I illustrated in earlier chapters, urban residents are not as bothered 
by immigrants as rural residents. I argue this occurs because they have made a decision to live in 
an urban center and they probably expect to see many people of different racial and ethnic 
backgrounds. Therefore, the lack of perceived contact with other groups members might make 
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large cities less likely to pass immigration ordinances since threat levels may be lower in urban 
areas than they are in rural areas.  
Conversely, minority representation in small town city councils typically lags far behind 
the political power of whites. Hence, if there is a significant percent of the population that feels 
threatened by the Latino growth in their town, they yield an immense amount of political power. 
In Hazelton, PA, local officials used immigration was a wedge issue to gain local and state 
notoriety. Lou Barletta used this platform to gain favor within his town, and towns around 
Hazelton, and was elected to congress in 2010. In Fremont, NE citizen pressure hit a boiling 
point to which the city council had no choice but to put the ordinance up for a vote. Still, there 
are many towns like these two cases across the country, I am curious as to what makes the rural 
towns that pass an ordinance difference from those that do not.   
Ramakrishnan & Wong’s (2010) research on local immigrant ordinance passage is the 
first study to look at this problem using city-level data. In their study, they illustrate that Latino 
population growth and partisanship drive city-level immigration ordinances. While I agree with 
their study, I believe there is room for improvement. First, since 2000, 57 localities total have 
passed an anti-immigrant ordinances, 47 of these localities have been in small rural communities. 
My critique here is that rural towns seem to be driving their analysis; yet, they make 
generalizations about all cities regardless of size. This seems problematic especially when you 
consider the national public opinion results illustrated in chapter 2. There are significant 
differences in the feelings of threat and anxiety held by rural and urban residents. These feelings 
directly influence attitudes on local immigrant ordinances. These differences should be examined 
separately, especially since most of the immigrant ordinances have been occurring in rural 
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towns.  The rural towns are driving their analysis and I intend to delve deeper into the probability 
of ordinance passage.  
Second, they argue that the Latino population growth from 1990-2000 is statistically 
related to local immigrant ordinance passage. I agree with their assessment and actually argue 
similar hypothesis, however, out of the 47 rural towns that passed a local ordinance only one was 
passed before 2000. The city-level movement of passing local immigrant ordinances mainly 
occurred between 2000-2010. I argue that the change in Latino population from 2000-2010 is the 
main reason rural towns have decided to take on immigration policy. Therefore, to accurately 
examine rural local immigration ordinances, the Latino population change between the periods 
of policy activity must be included. The Latino population changed dramatically within this 10 
year time period.  
Figure 3.  
Percent Change in Hispanic or Latino Populationby County: 2000 to 2010 
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Figure 3, distributed by the United States Census, illustrates county-level Latino 
population change from 2000-2010. If you look closely at the map, the change in population is 
not occurring in destinations where Latinos have typically lived like the Southwest. The change 
is occurring in atypical destinations like the Deep South and areas in the rural Northwest. These 
are areas where agriculture and meat-plants have taken up residency because of the local tax 
credits afforded to them. Much of the Latino population change in these rural areas is substantial. 
The darker shades of blue indicate higher percentages of Latino population growth in these 10 
years. It is clear that many parts of rural America have witnessed upwards of 100% increase in 
their Latino population. In Fremont, Nebraska for example, their Latino population went from 
4.3% to 11.9% this is an increase of approximately 177%! I argue that the dramatic growth of the 
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Latino population in rural America in a short period of time drives city-level immigrant policy 
adoption. I hypothesize that, 
H7: As the Latino population change increases rural towns become more likely to pass an 
anti-immigrant ordinance.  
 
I argue this occurs because it is not unlike the perception of threat. At the individual-
level, threatened respondents are more likely to support anti-immigrant policies because it is a 
way to rid them of the “immigrant problem”. At the city-level, passing these types of ordinances 
is used as a deterrent to discourage further immigration. At the same time, it is used to create a 
second-class citizenry where Latinos already in these rural towns feel unwelcomed and 
unwanted.  
There are various forms of local ordinances aimed at immigrants and Hispanics. These 
include, but are not limited to: housing, employment, police ordinances, along with the 
establishment of English as the city’s official language (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). 
Housing ordinances typically try to compel landlords to verify the immigrant status of tenants or 
limit the number of tenants in a household. If they do not comply with this local ordinance they 
are typically subject to fines. Employment ordinances usually come in the form of denying 
business licenses or city contracts to businesses who knowingly hire undocumented immigrants. 
Along with denying potential contracts, employers are also typically fined for hiring 
undocumented workers. The housing and employment ordinances were the basis of the 
ordinance passed in Fremont, NE.  
Police ordinances can subject officers to become make-shift Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) officers. Local police are given the task of stopping and questioning those 
they believe to be in the U.S. illegally. This is racial profiling because of the amount of power it 
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gives to local law enforcement to stop groups they believe are committing crimes, in this case, 
but not limited to, being in the U.S. illegally.   
English-only laws have also been passed at the local-level. Enforcing English-only laws 
typically means providing government services like: police enforcement, school, and social 
services information in English-only. It inherently demeans Spanish and therefore the Latino 
culture.  
All these local ordinances are designed to make immigrants and Latinos in these 
communities feel unwelcome. The idea is to deter further immigration and make Latinos already 
living there rethink their living situation. Many of the 47 rural towns that passed anti-immigrant 
ordinances passed a combination of the four listed above to try and make the living situation 
unbearable.  Again, the argument made by proponents of Arizona’s SB1070 law was that if the 
environment became so bad for immigrants they would eventually want to move to another state. 
The same can be said about each of these individual ordinances.  
Data & Methods 
To test my hypothesis, I use a dataset consisting entirely of rural towns. I use information 
gathered from the United States Census and City-data.com. The dataset is a nationally 
representative sample of 100 rural towns representing 42 different states. According to the 2010 
census, the minimum population in the dataset is 769 and a maximum of 48,520 with a mean of 
16,539.  
To find out which towns have passed an anti-immigrant ordinance I use data compiled by 
the Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM). FIRM is an interest group that advocates for 
more restrictive immigration policies. Their data includes all towns, cities, and counties that have 
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passed and/or proposed an anti-immigrant ordinance, along with those that have passed a pro-
immigrant ordinance since 2007.  
For this study, I am only interested in rural towns whose citizens have passed an anti-
immigrant ordinance. The passage could have been done by ballot initiative like in the case of 
Fremont, NE or through their local public officials. I take the FIRM data since 2007 and also 
include towns that I researched that have also passed an ordinance since then, this yields an 
N=47 towns representing 19 different states. Another 53 rural communities are also included in 
the analysis as a control. Therefore, I create a quasi-experiment. Like most scientific experiments 
there must be two groups each having the same chance of receiving the treatment. In this case, 
my population samples are rural towns under 50,000. All of them had an equal chance of passing 
an immigrant ordinance. The 47 towns that did pass an ordinance, in this case, received the 
treatment. The 53 rural towns used as controls are used as a baseline to compare differences 
between towns that passed an ordinance and those that did not. The dependent variable is 
analyzed using a logistic regression model where a rural town passing an anti-immigrant 
ordinance equals 1 and towns that do not pass an immigrant ordinance are equal to 0.  
Data on each town was collected using information provided by the 2000 and 2010 
United States Census along with specific information on each town available through city-
data.com. The data from the U.S. census allowed me to accurately assess the current population 
of the towns by race and ethnicity in 2010. I use data taken from the 2000 U.S. census to make 
casual inferences about the change in Hispanic population over 10 years.  
 City-data.com is a website that has been featured on CNN, USA Today, and many other 
news outlets across the country. The website has compiled data over 74,000 cities across the U.S. 
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and offers statistics on a variety of socio-economic, demographic, economic, and political 
indicators specific to each city. 
Independent Variables 
Latino population change and other control variables are included in the model. The 
controls highlight some previous theories that may be associated to local-level immigration 
ordinance passage. The independent variable is the Latino population change in the town that has 
occurred from 2000-2010. The difference between these two census periods allows me to 
examine how large or small the Latino population has grown in each town. Sizeable growth of 
the Latino population is heightened because of the limited size and resources of small towns. All 
the rural towns that have passed a law saw significant growth in their Latino population over this 
period of time. On average, the Latino population in these rural towns grew from 8% in 2000 to 
14% of the total population in 2010. This is an average increase of 75% in rural communities that 
are historically unaccustomed to minority populations in their towns.  Such dramatic changes in 
communities that are rural, older, and typically conservative (McKee 2008) incites anxiety 
among residents.  The appearance of Mexican restaurants, Spanish language media, social 
services available in Spanish, and changing school demographics are all highly visible indicators 
that makes rural residents in these towns perceive that the Latino presence is overwhelming and 
something must be done to take care of the “immigrant problem”.   
For controls, I include a variety of economic and demographic indicators to evaluate 
other factors that may influence anti-immigrant ordinance passage. I include a measure of the 
percentage of the Hispanic population in 2010 relative to the total local population. I suggest that 
the greater the Hispanic population the more likely that there has been a Hispanic presence in the 
city for an extended period of time. In other words, in contrast to dramatic Hispanic population 
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change, the larger the Hispanic community the more likely it is they have established themselves 
as part of the community which inhibits more tolerance (Gimpel and Lay 2008). The 
contribution by Hispanics in these towns in the areas of services, economics, and politics have 
already been witnessed by the established Anglo majority over time and therefore has led to 
decreased feelings of anxiety, the trigger that stimulates feelings of White opposition (Brader et. 
al. 2008). 
Nicolson-Crotty and Nicolson-Cotty (2011) in their state-level study on immigrant 
policies found that industries that employ vast numbers of immigrants can significantly influence 
state leaders to adopt fewer anti-immigrant policies. In light of this finding, I include a variable 
that measures the % Food Jobs there are in a city relative to the total job percentage. In this 
measure, food jobs consist of jobs like meat-packing, food-processing plants, and agriculture.  
While I acknowledge the fact that immigrants work in a variety of service positions as well, I 
argue this variable captures the industry that has most significantly changed the rural landscape 
for Latino occupations (Jeffards & Millard 2004; Gouveia and Stull 1997; Broadway and Stull 
1991; Stull et. al. 1995).  
 The next set of variables measure various socio-economic factors within rural towns that 
may contribute to passing anti-immigrant ordinances. Using census data, I measure Median Age 
and percent African American as controls. As I have shown with the public opinion data, older 
rural residents are more likely to favor restrictive immigration policies. Therefore, I expect the 
higher proportion of older residents in a town the more likely it will be to pass an anti-immigrant 
ordinance. Conversely, communities with younger populations have a higher probability of 
growing up and possibly attending schools with Hispanics and have friends or coworkers who 
may be Hispanic.  
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The percentage of African Americans in a community may also influence the likelihood 
of passing an anti-immigrant ordinance. As Gay notes, when African Americans feel a 
competition for resources from Latinos they react more harshly in their attitudes towards Latinos 
(2006). I also illustrated this example in Table 3. Therefore, I expect that as the % African 
Americans increases, support for an immigrant ordinance will also increase.  
The city-data website provided several factors that might also influence the passage of 
anti-immigrant ordinances. Education, in the form of percent of the population with a bachelor’s 
degree, would be more likely to decrease the likelihood of passage of an anti-immigrant 
ordinance because residents with lower levels of education may feel competition from Latinos 
for similar jobs. I also include a county level measure of the percentage of 2008 McCain voters 
to control for republican partisanship.  Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) find that the percent 
republican in a city significantly increases their likelihood of proposing or passing an ordinance. 
I suggest this variable is interesting to include because most rural towns are republican 
strongholds (McKee 2008). However, I expect this variable to be unrelated to anti-immigrant 
ordinance passage because most rural towns are republican therefore there should not be any 
significant differences.  
Median income is also included in the analysis. I expect that as the median income in a 
town increases, the town will be more likely to pass an anti-immigrant ordinance because higher 
income residents will view immigrants as a burden on their quality of life. Communities with 
higher income levels will be more likely to care about property value and the wealth of the real 
estate around them which they might feel immigrants will decrease.  
Economic indicators are also included in the analysis to control for alternative hypotheses 
that suggest negative attitudes towards Latinos and immigrants are driven by the competition for 
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jobs. The 2011 Unemployment Rate measures the town’s unemployment rate as of March 2011. 
I expect the unemployment rate to exhibit a positive influence on adoption of an anti-immigrant 
ordinance because of the negative perceptions of Hispanics taking American jobs.  
Finally, I include a dichotomous variable that compares rural towns in the South=1 to 
rural towns not in the South=0. I include this measure because of the common perception that the 
rural South is generally more favorable to restrictive immigrant policies.  
Findings 
Looking at city-level data allows us to generalize on the types of rural towns that are 
more likely to support anti-immigrant ordinances. It is important to learn the types of towns and 
types of individuals who live in rural towns that might be more likely to support immigrant 
ordinances, which helps scholars understand why rural towns are significantly different from 
urban areas. Much of the previous research suggests it is just a function of partisanship, but as I 
show in Table 7 changing demographics influence policy change. Table 7 illustrates (Column 1) 
the logistic regression coefficients that predict the factors that are related to a rural town passing 
an immigrant ordinance. Looking at column 1a demonstrates the change in probability of the 
dependent variable as the statistically significant variables are moved from their minimum to 
their maximum.  
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Table 7. Local-Level Analysis of Immigrant Ordinance Passage 
 (1)  
Local Immigrant 
Ordinance Passed 
(1a) 
Probability 
 Change 
MinMax 
Hispanic Pop. 0.0761* .59 
Change 2000-2010 (0.0442)  
 
2000 Hispanic  
 
0.0485 
 
Pop. (2.2858) 
 
 
South 0.0433  
 (0.5613) 
 
 
Total Pop. 3.392* .42 
 (1.8039) 
 
 
Education -7.128* -.71 
 (3.2057) 
 
 
Unemployment -7.341  
Rate (10.0687) 
 
 
% African 0.327  
Am. (1.6851) 
 
 
Median  4.367* .71 
Income (1.9683) 
 
 
Median 0.0993* .66 
Age (0.0443) 
 
 
% Repub. 3.096  
 (2.1641) 
 
 
% Food Jobs -5.359  
 (6.3825) 
 
 
_cons -6.357*  
 (2.7879)  
N 100  
Pseudo R
2 .1172  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 
Note: One-Tailed Test 
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Model 1 illustrates that the bigger the change in Latino population the more likely a rural 
town is to pass an anti-immigrant ordinance. This finding is compliments and adds to previous 
work that analyzes local immigration policy. By using more contemporary data and singling out 
rural towns, scholars can look more closely at the factors that drive city-level immigrant 
ordinance passage. I look only at rural towns because they are the large majorities of localities 
that are passing immigrant ordinances.  Therefore, rather than examine all cities, I suggest it is 
best to focus on the towns that are driving local immigrant ordinance passage across the country.  
Also, the majority of immigrant ordinance passage has occurred between 2000-2010, 
therefore, using the most recent census data provides a better illustration of how Hispanic 
population change is associated with the passage of a rural immigrant ordinance. As I explained 
in chapter 2, the debate over whether the federal congress should pass comprehensive 
immigration reform hit a boiling point in 2006, resulting in protests and demonstrations across 
the country. It hit a boiling point at this time because the Latino population grew immensely 
during this decade. Supporters of immigration reform wanted an updated immigration policy for 
undocumented workers while opponents wanted stricter border controls. Looking at data that 
occurred during the height of this issue, which I have done throughout this dissertation, gives 
scholars better insights into a constantly fluid issue.   
The shift in demographics in rural towns is more visible than in urban areas. As I have 
already illustrated in earlier chapters, rural residents perceive that their community has become a 
destination for criminals and economic and political threats. The large the shifts in Latino 
population change in their town, the more evident these perceptions become.  
The strength of this variable is illustrated in the predicted probabilities in Table 7 and in 
Figure 4 below.   
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Figure 4. City-Level Analysis of Ordinance Passage 
 
The predicted probabilities in Table 7 demonstrate that, all else equal, the minimum to maximum 
change in probability yields a 59% change in the dependent variable. The impact of this variable 
is demonstrated in the figure. Figure 4 illustrates that a town with a negative growth in their 
Latino population, meaning their Latino population from 2000-2010 actually got smaller, has 
about a 30% probability of passing a local immigrant ordinance. Towns with negative Latino 
growth or small Latino growth have a low probability of passing local immigrant laws. This 
occurs because their town has not changed much. Regardless of how big the Hispanic population 
in their town is, the important factor is that the change did not occur quickly (within the 10 year 
period). This is in stark contrast to rural towns that did experience a large change in their Latino 
population from 2000-2010. Rural towns that saw their Latino populations increase anywhere 
from 20-30% are approximately 70-80% more likely to pass a local ordinance. This is where the 
50+% predicted probability change is illustrated in the figure. On average, rural towns that have 
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passed an immigrant ordinance exhibited a Latino population change over 6%. Comparatively, 
rural towns in this analysis that had not passed an ordinance saw an average Latino population 
change of about 4%. While these two averages may not seem like a lot, Figure 4 illustrates that 
the difference between a 4 and 6% change in Latino population yields a greater or less than 50% 
probability of policy adoption. These statistics are holding all other variables at their means. 
Therefore simply viewing the average Latino population change illustrates how this variable can 
carry considerable influence on policy adoption.  
Like the public opinion analysis in previous chapters-education, income, and age are all 
statistically related to anti-immigrant policy support.  Rural towns with lower percentages of 
residents with a bachelor’s degree are more likely to pass anti-immigrant ordinances. I believe 
this may occur because residents with lower education feel an increased competition because of 
Latinos. Many of the jobs that Latinos often compete for in rural areas are jobs that need little to 
no formal education, hence, towns with larger populations of lower educated residents are most 
likely to feel like their job opportunities are threatened.  
Towns with higher median incomes are more likely to pass anti-immigrant laws as well. I 
attribute this to higher populations of wealthier individuals feeling like their community loses 
value due to immigrants. They perceive that their overall quality of life is down-graded because 
of immigrants who they perceive to be more likely to commit crimes.  
As expected, populations with higher percentages of older residents are more likely to 
pass local immigrant ordinances. Older populations are more likely to remember when there was 
little demographic change in their town. They may feel like the quick population changes are 
contributing to them losing their American culture and identity. This generalization is supported 
with the previous public opinion results in the dissertation.  
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Conclusion: Future Implications 
 Throughout this dissertation I illustrated why I argue rural residents are more likely to 
support local anti-immigrant ordinances. However, unlike previous studies I go beyond claiming 
that partisanship and ideology drive immigrant attitudes. Instead, I base my argument on 
psychological feelings of anxiety and threat.  
Examining psychological feelings and how they are related to immigration policy 
preferences is unique because it measures what the individual thinks is going on around him/her. 
Rather than focusing on labels like Republican, Democrat, Liberal, or Conservative, measuring 
perception gives scholars insight into the human mind. By definition, most people know what it 
means to be a Republican or a Democrat, however, only an individual can know how he/she feels 
about the world around them. Using nationally representative public opinion data, I was able to 
show that rural residents were more likely than urban residents to believe that there are “many” 
recent immigrants in their community. Further, they also felt more uneasy than urban residents 
about contact with limited English speakers. Of course, the reality is there are many more 
immigrants in urban areas, yet, the perception among rural residents leads them to believe 
otherwise. This occurs because of the limited areas available in a small town.  
In rural communities, there is usually one high school, one primary grocery store, few 
places of entertainment, and a few churches for worship. Therefore, the constant contact that a 
rural resident is forced to have (whether they feel comfortable with it or not) occurs on a daily 
basis. This differs from urban neighborhoods where residents can theoretically eat, live, and play 
in the same area without coming into contact with people unlike themselves. Still, even when 
contact with a limited English speaker is made by urban and rural residents, rural residents feel 
more bothered by this contact. Studies that examine social contact theory suggest that constant 
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contact over time will digress negative attitudes (Oliver & Wong 2003), but this is not happening 
in rural America. Oliver & Wong’s (ibid) study analyzes data taken from four large urban areas. 
I believe they get their results because even though their population is separated by 
neighborhood, their test subjects expect to come into contact with people of other racial or ethnic 
backgrounds because they live in a city.  
Contrast this to the lives of residents in rural America. They have separated themselves 
from large urban areas to be away from people that are unlike them. The rural American way of 
life: politically, economically, and culturally is vested in the status quo. Therefore, when quick 
changes occur in their community or they view something unknown or foreign to them, they 
become bothered by this occurrence. Hence, the reason rural residents feel more anxious about 
contact with immigrants; they do not expect it because of the area they live in. To rural residents, 
coming into contact with an immigrant or someone that has limited English skills should happen 
in the city at a Mexican restaurant, not in their all-American small town. The fact that 
immigrants are migrating into their town makes rural residents worry about their livelihood. And 
because of the dynamics of a small town, the perception is that immigrants are growing 
exponentially.  
With the growing immigrant population in rural American, comes problems because of 
the changing demographics and therefore alteration of the status quo. I illustrated that rural 
residents were more likely than urban residents to believe that immigrants took their jobs, made 
their local services worse, and increased crime. There are a multitude of reasons why someone 
might lose a job, have bad government services, or believe that crime has increased, but the 
perception amongst rural residents is that immigrants are to blame. I suggest this occurs because 
the changes in demographics occurring in their town, the only change they believe in the status 
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quo, drives them to perceive immigrants are the cause of these problems. It is not unlike 
historical trends where during bad economic periods immigrants are blamed. The growing 
immigrant population, to rural residents, is a threat to their livelihood. They perceive them to be 
the cause of their personal job loss (economic threat), their deteriorating services (political 
threat), and the increased crime (family threat) in their town. None of this may actually be true in 
reality, but in their reality-in the mind of the rural resident-it is what is occurring, and it drives 
local immigration ordinance support.  
The constant state of threat that rural residents perceive they are living in makes them 
more likely to support policy measures they feel would relieve themselves of this threat. In this 
study, I have shown that the tools in which rural residents use to dispose themselves of their 
perceived threat from immigrants comes in the form of local policy decision-making. My field 
work in the rural Midwest illustrated that there are rural whites living in towns that have not 
passed an ordinance who, if given the opportunity, would support English-only and racial 
profiling laws in their community. These policies are designed to make Latinos feel like second-
class citizens. English-only laws diminish the importance of the Spanish language, reducing 
Latino’s overall self-esteem. Racial profiling makes minorities, which in rural areas are mostly 
Latino, feel like they are being constantly targeted by law enforcement. This law uses stereotypes 
to arrest suspicious individuals without cause. Supporters of this law may feel like the police 
harassment attached to racial profiling might make immigrants want to leave their community. 
This is what these laws are designed to do and they work.  
As we saw in states like Arizona, Georgia, and Alabama, and localities like Fremont, NE, 
the laws do drive immigrants to leave and decreases further immigration. Yet, politicians caught 
up on placing the blame on immigrants do not see the economic consequences of losing such a 
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large labor force. As I mentioned earlier, in Fremont, NE, the chamber of commerce and 
business leaders pressured city officials to take a revote to no avail. The loss of labor due to the 
Ordinance No. 5165 led elites to try and rescind the vote even after the courts had upheld the 
law. The problem in Fremont, and with city officials in towns like Fremont who do not want a 
law like this, is that they did not do enough to educate the public on the economic benefits of 
immigrants early-on. Public officials and business leaders can have an important role in how 
their residents view immigration. They can influence public opinion by showcasing positive 
economic gains because of immigrants. For example, in Dodge City, KS, the city attorney we 
spoke to told us that without the immigrant labor force, Dodge City would not have the tourism 
attractions they currently own (the casino and boot jack hill). Therefore, being able to examine 
and determine which types of towns are might be likely to pass these ordinances in the near 
future might allow elites time to explain to their constituents the positives that are attached to 
immigration. When a town hits a critical-mass near a 10% Latino population change then elites 
can begin to exchange ideas on how to address immigrants to their public.   
For scholars of immigration policy, determining which towns are more likely to pass 
local ordinances allows us to study the different ways that political elites might use immigrants 
for their own political gain. For example, city officials in Dodge City publicly support 
immigrants and celebrate Mexican holidays with public events. They do this because Dodge City 
is now over 50% Latino so they are being strategic for their political gain. Likewise, former 
mayor of Hazleton, PA (38% Hispanic), Lou Barletta, used his anti-immigrant platform to win a 
congressional seat that represents Hazleton and several small towns around it. The main 
difference between these two cases is the size of the Latino population; still, how policy 
entrepreneurs use immigration to their advantage is an untapped area of research. Furthermore, 
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this dissertation not only serves elites and scholars to know which towns are more likely to pass 
ordinances, but why. In this dissertation, I lay out a map that illustrates why rural Americans are 
angry and threatened by immigrants. Elites would be well served to read this dissertation and 
examine ways to talk to their community about jobs, how immigrants are making government 
services better, and that they are not increasing crime.  
Finally, the future of the immigration policy debate is far from over. With the current 
congress withholding a vote on the senate’s “Gang of Eight” plan, more rural towns may feel 
like the federal government will not do anything about the “immigration problem”. Consequently 
we may see more rural towns pass local immigrant ordinances. Most of these ordinances, during 
President Obama’s administration, will be subject to suit by the Department of Justice. However, 
these laws and the people that support them base their decision-making on perception. As was 
the case in Fremont, immigrants left after the passage of the law, regardless of what happened in 
court. Therefore, rural residents may feel like simply taking a stand on immigration and passing 
immigrant ordinances will be a symbolic stand, that their town does not want immigrants. 
However, while rural residents may not want immigrants, their town might need them, here is the 
hypocrisy, here is the reality versus the perception.  
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Appendix 
Marginal Effects for Table 1 
Model 1     Model 2 
Rural 
        Avg|Chg|         Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .05802414     .08142902 
 
Suburb 
        Avg|Chg|        Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .01687002      .01910897 
 
White 
        Avg|Chg|        Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .03559711       .03309583 
 
Black 
        Avg|Chg|       Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .01479712     .02227152 
 
Female 
        Avg|Chg|        Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .00175972     .00005367 
 
Age 
            Avg|Chg|       Avg|Chg|      
Min->Max   .05117536     .10625246 
MargEfct   .00063253     .00128909 
 
Education 
            Avg|Chg|        Avg|Chg|      
Min->Max   .06366233      .02265501 
MargEfct   .01063647     .00381105 
 
Income 
        Avg|Chg|         Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .01203713     .00722238 
Employed 
        Avg|Chg|        Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .00694844     .01230872 
 
Married 
        Avg|Chg|         Avg|Chg|      
0->1    .0164373     .0049425 
 
Republican 
        Avg|Chg|        Avg|Chg|      
0->1   .00379915     .01636565 
 
Conservative 
        Avg|Chg|       Avg|Chg|       
0->1   .00839534      .00104044 
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Table 7. City-level Descriptive Statistics 
 
Dependent Variable 
# of cities passed ordinance 42 
# of cities with no passage of ordinance 58 
 
Type of 
Ordinance 
English Only Housing Employment Police Combination 
 18 5 8 1 10 
 
Table 7 Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
  
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
% Hispanic Pop. 
Change 
 
.05389 .03700 .063005 -.015 .332 
% 2010 Hispanic 
Pop. 
 
.15590 .08600 .180044 .002 .912 
2010 Total Pop. 
 
16,943 13,800 12,430 769 48,520 
% Bachelors 
Degree 
 
.20290 .17600 .123218 .035 .723 
2011 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
.08736 .08700 .026581 .036 .184 
% African 
American 
 
.08733 .03000 .146802 0 .773 
Median Income 
 
$47,353 $43,300 $16,781 $20,700 $100,800 
 
Median Age 
 
38.565 36.500 6.2935 22 54.2 
% Republican 
 
.5466 .5500 .12980 .23 .85 
% Food Jobs 
 
.02956 .00800 .057429 0 .374 
South = 38, Non-South=62 
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